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Abstract: Contrary to critics of the Supreme Court's current equal pro-
tection approach to religious liberty, this Article contends that, from the
very first federal free exercise cases, the Equal Protection and Free Ex-
ercise Clauses have been mutually intertwined. The seeds of an equal
protection analysis of free exercise were, indeed, planted before the
Fourteenth Amendment within the constitutional jurisprudence of sev-
eral states. Furthermore, this Article argues, equal protection ap-
proaches should not be uniformly disparaged. Rather, the drawbacks
that commentators have observed result largely from the Supreme
Court's application of an inadequate version of equal protection. By ig-
noring the lessons that the Fourteenth Amendment taught about the
nature of group classification and instead emphasizing the individual,
the current approach downplays free exercise claims. Considering this
tendency within the context of contemporary theories of group rights
and antidiscrimination law, the Article concludes that the now-
neglected, alternative strand of an equal protection approach to free
exercise should be revived.
INTRODUCTION
In the legal imagination, the phrase "equal protection of the laws"
conjures visions of lengthy battles over civil rights,' claims about
* Assistant Professor, Cornell Law School. I am very grateful to the following people
for their assistance with various stages of this project Rich Ford, Roberto Gonzalez, Toni
Grey, Toby Fleytens, Amalia Kessler, Doug Kysar, Christopher Lund, Trevor Morrison,
Steve Shiffrin, Gary Simson, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Nelson Tebbe, and especially the late
Gerald Gunther. Jenifer Ellis and Matthew Feller provided excellent research assistance.
Gregg Katz and the other editors of the Boston college Law Review were also extremely help-
ful.
I See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ. of Topeka (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also MICHAEL1 KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUAL-
[Tv 344-442 (2004) (discussing the Brown decisions within the context of the civil rights
movement).
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women's capacity to attend previously all-male military academies, 2
 and
assertions of gay and lesbian individuals' right to be free from discrimi-
nation.3
 What it does not automatically evoke is a religious practitio-
ner's demand for an exception from anti-drug laws to ingest peyote in a
Native American ritual. 4
 This Article suggests that it is precisely such a
claim for the free exercise of religion that falls within the core of what
equal protection of the laws has meant historically. Furthermore, con-
sidering free exercise challenges in terms of at least one historically
grounded version of equal protection would lead courts to value the
religious person's practice as emanating from a set of communally
shared pursuits—ones connected with a group bound together not ac-
cording to natural characteristics, but rather through religious worship.
Recent religion clause jurisprudence has placed a priority upon
equality—whether rejecting only those laws targeted against, rather
than those burdening, the practices of minority religions or upholding
the evenhanded distribution of public funds to religious and non-
religious providers.5
 This tendency has come under intense criticism
from those who view principles of equality as either insufficiently pro-
tective of religious liberty or permitting erosion of the "wall of separa-
tion" between church and state. 6
 As this Article argues, approaching
the Free Exercise Clause from the vantage point of equality—or, more
specifically, equal protection—is neither new nor entirely susceptible to
those critiques that have been articulated.? Instead, at the state level,
the concept of equal protection initially emanated out of an attempt to
ensure free exercise. With ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
at least one version of equal protection reasoning demonstrated itself
similarly favorable to religious liberty on the federal level.
This Article contends that objections against the use of equal
protection in the free exercise context result from two sets of divisions
within equal protection analysis itself. The first involves the distinction
between formal and substantive notions of equality. Whereas a formal
vision of religious equality would protect free exercise solely against
facial or intentional discrimination, a substantive conception would
assess whether individuals within a particular sect experienced a
2 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5
 See infra notes 27-30, 309-25, and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
7
 This Article attempts to defend an equality approach to the Free Exercise Clause but
remains agnostic with respect to the Establishment Clause..
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greater burden than those in other groups when engaging in religious
practices. The second division concerns the relationship between the
individual and the group. Certain equality-based methods consider
the particular claimant in isolation, whereas others evaluate the indi-
vidual's request for accommodation within the context of the prac-
tices of the religious collectivity to which he or she belongs. Although
substantive equality is not inevitably tied to placing a priority upon
groups, those courts and cases more attentive to the relation between
individual and group have tended to eschew a formal approach. Of-
ten the significance of a particular religious ritual may not be appar-
ent to the outside observer. Examining the role and function of a
practice within a particular group may allow spectators to translate the
activity into an analogous practice from a more familiar religious con-
text. For example, a comparison with the Catholic use of sacramental
wine might be useful in analyzing the claim that devotional use of the
substance hoasca should be exempted from the prohibition of the
Controlled Substances Act.8
 The negotiation between formal and sub-
stantive treatments of the equality of free exercise emerged first in the
states; only with the arrival of a federal jurisprudence of equal protec-
tion, however, was the relationship between individual and group in
the pursuit of free exercise claims fully developed.
The seeds of an equal protection analysis of free exercise were
planted even before the Fourteenth Amendment.° Indeed, it was in
discussions of religious liberty rather than race that the language of
equal protection first wended its way into use in the several states. Vari-
ous state constitutions referred to the equal protection of individuals
within different religious denominations and to the equal privileges
and immunities or equal civil rights that they should enjoy.i° The
phrase "equal protection" did not initially designate full equality of
rights. As Professor Philip Hamburger has argued, equal protection in
some contexts imported "an equality only of the protection provided by
civil law for natural liberty," whereas equal Civil rights, or equal privi-
leges and immunities, "was a standard so rigorous it prevented civil laws
from allocating either protection or privileges on the basis of religious
differences."" At the same time, however, the state cases adjudicated in
15
 See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, No. 09-1089 (U.S.
Feb. 21, 2006) (analyzing such a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
9 See infra notes 80-164 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 80-107 and accompanying text.
11
 Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About Equal
Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. Cr. REV. 295, 299.
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terms of the constitutional religion clauses, whether the equal protec-
tion or equal civil rights versions, demonstrate the development of a
sense that two different conceptions of discrimination might be at
play. 12
 The disparity between the two can be illustrated in terms of the
operation of Sunday closing laws. The question often arose as to
whether these statutes, when applied to those who observed Saturday as
the Sabbath, generated a burden upon religious practice. Although
many, including Justice Field when he sat upon the California Supreme
Court, believed that it did not, some articulated a vision of discrimina-
tion against free exercise that would recognize as a burden the eco-
nomic problems arising out of forcing Jews and other Saturday Sab-
batarians to close their establishments two days a week rather than one."
Some states also developed a fairly far-reaching understanding of
what the protection of free exercise meant, grounding prosecutions of
those who disrupted religious services in the notion that this kind of
state enforcement was necessary to fully protect the practice of relig-
ious liberty." This construction may have been encouraged by the ab-
sence of something like an establishment clause in many of the state
constitutions. Without a prohibition against state establishment of relig-
ion, the states were obliged to make a greater effort to ensure that each
religious group was able to pursue its own variety of worship. The pro-
tection of free exercise thus took on some of the aspects in the states
that Establishment Clause jurisprudence possesses on the federal level.
On the federal level, equal protection and free exercise have
been mutually intertwined from the first free exercise cases, as dem-
onstrated most vividly by Justice Field's decision in Ho Ah Kow v. Nu-
nan, 15
 issued in 1879, only a few months after the Supreme Court de-
cided the first of the Mormon cases, Reynolds v. United States.' 6 In Ho
Ah Kow, an equal protection case involving a Chinese prisoner's chal-
lenge to a San Francisco ordinance that required inmates to cut their
hair, Justice Field reasoned that the law created a discriminatory bur-
den upon the free exercise rights of the "special class" involved, com-
posed of Chinese-American individuals who wore a queue, or braid, as
part of their religious practice.'? This version of equal protection en-
12 See infra notes 108-39 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 108-39 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 140-64 and accompanying text.
15
 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
16
 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding a conviction of polygamy against a free exercise chal-
lenge by a Mormon petitioner).
17 See infra notes 176-91 and accompanying text.
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tailed consideration of substantive rather than formal equality and
relied on the plaintiff's status as a member of a group constituted not
simply by nationality or race but rather by shared religious commit-
ments. The ratification of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment spawned a new awareness of the possibility that
certain kinds of legislative classifications might signal an effort to dis-
criminate against members of a particular group, such as racial mi-
norities. By extension, the courts developed at least one strand of doc-
trine that displayed an increased sensitivity to the ways in which laws
that appeared acceptable on their face might burden the religious
practices of individuals within a certain collectivity. 18
At the same time, however, another version of equal protection
also took hold, one insisting that the accommodation of free exercise
would turn each individual into "a law unto himself' and sever the
bonds forcing society to cohere. 19 Exemplified by cases affirming the
constitutionality of prohibitions against the polygamous practices of
some Mormons, such as Reynolds itself, this understanding of equal
protection emphasized the applicability of general laws. 2° It is this
second, reduced version of the equal protection of free exercise that
has assumed its place within current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith
provided the clearest expression of this tendency, when Justice Scalia
emphasized the presumptive validity of "neutral laws of general appli-
cability" regardless of their capacity to burden religious practice. 2 i
The drawbacks in an equal protection approach that critics of the
Supreme Court's recent religion clause cases have observed thus do not
stem from employing an equal protection logic in the free exercise con-
text. Rather, the problems they identify emerge from applying an inade-
quate version of equal protection and ignoring the lessons that the Four-
teenth Amendment taught about the nature of group classification. 22
Instead of heeding those precedents, the Court has resorted to a set of
nineteenth-century notions—the reverence for neutral laws of general
applicability expressed in Reynolds, and the concept of color-blindness
1 ° See infra notes 165-95 and accompanying text.
19 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
20 See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
21 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885; see also infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
22
 Professor Peter Westen has argued that equality claims are "empty" because they are
largely predicated on prior assertions of rights. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality,
95 HARV. L. REV. 537,542 (1982). My argument draws on this insight in positing that two
different kinds of equal protection approaches have characterized analyses under the re-
ligion clauses.
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extracted from Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. FeTuson. 23 Emphasiz-
ing individualism and a "cultural" approach to groups that denies consti-
tutional protection for racial and religious rights by assimilating pro-
tected and unprotected classes, this new jurisprudence has sent the
Court's understanding of both race and religion backwards. In Part I, the
Article addresses the incompleteness of extant approaches, examining
scholarship on religion and equality as well as the resources provided by
political and critical theory. 24 Taken together, this material illuminates an
approach to conceiving of the relationship between individual and group
in the pursuit of free exercise claims as well as the perils of adopting a
"cultural" approach to racial and religious groups. Part II explores the
history of equal protection in the state constitutions and in free exercise
decisions under them.25 Part III then turns to the federal constitutional
context and traces the significance of two different strands of equal pro-
tection's influence on free exercise jurisprudence. 26
I. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP
This Part first examines current accounts of the relationship be-
tween equal protection and free exercise. It then elaborates on how
political theory, international and comparative law, and recent critiques
of antidiscrimination law can contribute to understanding the nature
of free exercise claims. Combining the approaches of political theory,
scholarship on U.S. constitutional law, and work on antidiscrimination
law permits an assessment of the blind spots that each entails. While
political theory may provide an account of the importance of groups
situated between the state and the individual, many thinkers appear
unwilling to differentiate between religious groups and other cultural
or ethnic collectivities. By contrast, within American constitutional law,
religion occupies a discrete and privileged place, conceived, on account
of constitutional structure, as largely separate from race and ethnicity.
Finally, for related disciplinary reasons, American antidiscrimination
law generally neglects the field of religious liberty while providing in-
sights that could valuably be applied to it.
23 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Reynolds,
98 U.S. at 166-67.
24 See infra notes 27-79 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 80-164 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 165-325 and accompanying text.
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As this Part contends, examining free exercise claims in terms of
the relationship between the individual and a religious collectivity allows
more insight into the meaning of particular religious practices. Such
insight may lead courts towards a substantive rather than formal account
of the equal protection of free exercise. At the same time, although it
may be tempting to assimilate claims for freedom of religious practice
with those for cultural rights, the former may be detrimentally eroded
by association with the latter. In this respect, arguments about the unde-
sirability of understanding racial difference in terms of cultural differ-
ence may apply equally to the conflation of religion with culture.
A. Religion and Equal Protection
From courtrooms to law schools, interest has recently focused on
equality in the arena of religious liberty. 27
 The kind of equality invoked
by scholars and courts is cognate with the idea of neutrality, as dis-
cussed in Part III, Section D, but the two should not be too easily
27
 Professor Steve Shiffrin has recently observed that
[clontemporary Supreme Court interpretations suggest that the religion
clauses are primarily rooted in the value of equality. For example, in inter-
preting the Free Exercise Clause, the United States Supreme Court has ar-
gued that in the absence of discrimination against religion or in the presence
of other constitutional values, it is not unconstitutional for a statute to inadver-
tently burden religion. Similarly, equality values have played a strung role in
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 9,
11-12 (2004) (emphasis added). Scholars like Professor Lawrence Sager also contend that
religion clause jurisprudence should concentrate on equality rather than liberty, and on
protection rather than privilege. See Lawrence G. Sager, The Free Exercise of Culture: Some
Doubts and Distinctions, in ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE. MUL:TICULTURAL CHAL-
/N LinettAt. DEMOCRACIES 165, 165-75 (Richard A. Schweder et al. eds., 2002);
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence C. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitu-
tional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 1245, 1282-83 (1994) (articu-
lating an 'equal regard" approach to religious exemptions that emphasizes protecting
religious minorities rather than privileging individual worshippers). As Sager elaborates,
"privilege flows from the perception of virtue or conceptual precedence; protection flows
from the perception of vulnerability to discrimination. The privileging of religion over
other important human commitments is normatively indefensible and practically unwork-
able ...." Sager, supra, at 172. One could trace religion scholars' engagement with equality
back to the work of Professor Philip Kurland, who attempted to reconcile the religion
clauses through an appeal to equal protection. See PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 17-18 (1961) (arguing that the
religion clauses of the constitution must be "read together as creating a doctrine more
akin to the reading of the equal protection clause than to the due process clause, i.e., they
must be read to mean that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for pur-
poses of governmental action ....").
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conflated. Whereas speaking in terms of neutrality suggests a formal
approach to equality, and gives a free hand to private decision-making,
emphasizing equality itself at least leaves open the possibility of adopt-
ing a substantive approach towards the impediments faced by various
religious groups. 28
 At the same time, the vision of equality that some
commentators endorse remains distinct from one based upon the heri-
tage of the Equal Protection Clause. 29
 This circumstance generally leads
commentators towards an individualistic account of equality that does
not sufficiently consider the relationship between individual and group
in the context of religious practice."
Even those who advocate a substantive rather than formal vision of
equality in the area of free exercise—recommending that laws burden-
ing religious practice as well as those specifically targeted against it be
invalidated under the Free Exercise Clause—do not associate this
stance with the protection of groups rather than individuals, or with
that of the individual in relation to the group." The long shadow cast
23 See Wirth', supra note 27, at 11 n.1 ("The emphasis on equality is closely associated
with, but not identical to, a 'neutrality' approach to the Establishment Clause. Formal—
not substantive—equality is the principal (but not exclusive) value of that approach. Neu-
trality is a doctrinal approach, then; formal equality is the primary value that it serves."
(citation omitted)); Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
699, 712 (2005) ("[Nleutrality requires government evenhandedness toward private com-
petition and choice. Equality, by contrast, concerns not private choice, but social status.
With regard to religion, equality focuses its attention on minority sects, protecting them
against discrimination, while neutrality focuses on private decision making.").
29 See Eisgruber & Sager, .supra note 27, at 1297-1301 (distinguishing their proposal for
treating religious liberty claims with "equal regard" from an "equal protection" approach).
" But see id. at 1298 (explaining that "Whe predominance of groups in religious prac-
tice is important to the understanding of both privilege and protection"); Stephen Pepper,
Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 BY1J L. Ray. 7, 41-42
(acknowledging the importance of the religious community in assertions of free exercise
and explaining that "[miany find in our current law, including constitutional law, an over-
emphasis on individualism and autonomy and a corresponding insufficient recognition of
and support for community and connection. Given the well recognized communal dimen-
sion in most religions, the Free Exercise Clause is the preeminent exception: the value of
community and connection are given explicit constitutional protection").
st See generally Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of
Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia's Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
Wm. & MARY L. Rev. 819 (1998) (arguing in favor of free exercise exemptions from a his-
torical perspective but omitting the role of groups). By contrast, Professor Richard Schrag-
ger has valuably focused upon the role of institutions intermediate between the individual
and the federal government in formulating a new understanding of how religious liberty
should be protected. See generally Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine
and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004). Although this Article dis-
agrees to a certain extent with Professor Schragger's conclusions, because it contends that
attention to the relationship between individual and group in the free exercise context
does not necessarily lead to viewing local governments as the level at which relations be-
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by Professor Owen Fiss's 1976 Article, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, has, by contrast, solidified the association between an insistence
on the substantive protection of equality and the acknowledgement of
particular groups in the equal protection context." As Professor Fiss
contended, the crucial inquiry for courts adjudicating equal protection
claims is whether a "state law or practice aggravates (or perpetuates?)
the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group."" As ap-
plied to religious liberty, this understanding of equal protection might
suggest that laws burdening minority religions should be subjected to
special scrutiny. 34
At the same time, however, Professor Fiss's notion of the group—
requiring that it be specifically "a social group," that that social group
"has been in a position of perpetual subordination," and that "the po-
litical power of the group is severely circumscribed"—may not best
describe religious collectivities, the status of which often shifts over
periods of time and disparate localities."
In whichever terms they are discussed, approaches to the religion
clauses grounded in equality have not remained unopposed. Those
justices objecting to the logic of current Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence have protested that the doctrines derived
from equal protection are inadequate to address the problems of re-
ligious liberty." Scholars have also diagnosed a variety of drawbacks to
tween church and state should be worked out, it similarly locates the site of free exercise in
a space claimed exclusively neither by the individual nor by the federal government. See id.
at 1811.
S2 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & Pun. Arr.
107 (1976).
33 Id. at 157.
34
 This approach might bear some resemblance to Professor Thomas Berg's suggestion
that the protection of minority religions should be the Court's paramount goal in both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause contexts. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Minority
Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (2004).
55 See Fiss, supra note 32, at 159-55.
" See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 877 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Whether
a law's benefit is sufficiently close to universally general welfare paradigms to be classified
with them, as distinct from religious aid, is a function of the purpose and effect of the chal-
lenged law in all its particularity. The judgment is not reducible to the application of any
formula. Evenhandedness of distribution as between religious and secular beneficiaries is a
relevant factor, but not a sufficiency test of constitutionality. There is no rule of religious
equal protection to the effect that any expenditure for the benefit of religious school stu-
dents is necessarily constitutional so long as public school pupils are favored on ostensibly
identical terms."); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If the First Amendment is to have any vitality, it ought
not be construed to cover only the extreme and hypothetical situation in which a State di-
rectly targets a religious practice. As we have noted in a slightly different context, IsItich
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interpreting the religion clauses in terms of equality. Some posit that
equal protection gives short shrift to important liberty interestsr or to
other values that should underlie religion clause adjudication." Oth-
ers see internal contradictions in the very application of the equality
principle to the religion clauses."
On those occasions when scholars do discuss analogies between
religion and equal protection and note the relationship between relig-
ion and other (suspect) classes, most relegate their analysis largely to
the Establishment Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause. 4° Even
the most detailed account of the relationship between the Free Exer-
cise and Equal Protection Clauses suggests that free exercise should
test has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest
level of minimum scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides.'" (citations
omitted)).
37 See Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Lib-
erty, 70 NEIL L. REV. 651,685 (1991) (contending that "the Smith approach is too unprotec-
tive of religious liberty").
" See generally Shiffrin, supra note 27 (arguing that the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clauses each rest on seven distinct values).
" See Tebbe, supra note 28, at 701-02 (contending that, despite the seeming advan-
tages of substantive over formal neutrality, the former offends what the author calls "sym-
metry," because the religious exemptions to neutral laws of general applicability that those
advocating substantive neutrality support violate substantive neutrality between religion
and non-religion).
40
 There are, of course, several exceptions. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 34; Eisgruber &
Sager, supra note 27, at 1282-1301 (arguing for an approach to religious liberty based
upon "equal regard" and comparing this model with an "equal protection" one).
The tendency to privilege the Establishment Clause emerges in scholars' comments
about how the Court considers religious groups. In the effort most explicitly devoted to
elaborating a connection between the treatment of collectivities under the religion and
Equal Protection Clauses, Professor Michael Mannheimer almost entirely disregards the
Free Exercise Clause. See generally Michael j. Mannheimer, Equal Protection Principles and the
Establishment Clause: Equal Participation in the Community as the Central Link 69 TEMP. L. REV.
95 (1996). Distinguishing the two contexts, he argues, "[t]he focus of the equal citizenship
approach to state religious establishments is on religion as status, not religion as belief or
practice. Thus, the incorporated Establishment Clause ensures not the equal protection
of the free exercise of religion,' but freedom from discrimination and stigmatization based
on religious status." Id. at 128. Similarly, Professor Noah Feldman, while persuasively ex-
ploring the political equality rationale that has come to dominate the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, focuses exclusively on establishment, and does not flesh out the
connection between the treatment of racial groups under equal protection analysis and
that of religious communities under the religion clauses. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to
Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAI.. L. REV. 673 (2002). Professor
Alan Brownstein likewise claims that "the free exercise clause should primarily be under-
stood to be an autonomy right, while the establishment clause should be strongly rooted in
equal protection doctrine." Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly
Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51
Oyno Sr. L.J. 89,94 (1990).
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be seen as an individual right, and distinguished from equal protec-
don on this basis.41 In Keeping the Faith, Professor Ira Lupu postulated
that "[the] individualized notion of impact is what constitutes the es-
sential difference between adjudication under the free exercise clause
and equal protection clause,"42 As he explained, basing his distinction
on the individualized nature of the "burdens and sacrifices" that peo-
ple arguing for free exercise-based exemptions must bear, Ifiree ex-
ercise principles protect autonomous, individual choices, not choices
dependent upon group membership."43
What each of these writers neglects is the distinctive similarity be-
tween the structure of free exercise and equal protection claims. Tech-
nically, they are correct—the right to the free exercise of religion is held
by individuals rather than groups;
 just as particular people assert viola-
tions of their equal protection rights. In bringing free exercise claims,
however, just as in pursuing equal protection ones, the challenger is
obliged to describe the collectivity to which she belongs, persuasively
alleging its religious character and the nature of the accompanying re-
ligious beliefs. Whether or not the Court considers this religious group
as the backdrop for an individual's claim may make the difference in
whether it accepts the validity of her free exercise argument.
B. Political Theory and Comparative Law Approaches
The individual rights emphasis of much U.S. constitutional law
scholarship notoriously neglects the increasing importance and recog-
nition of collective rights worldwide, both in their practical implemen-
tation in constitutional and human rights documents and in their de-
ployment within political theory." Supplementing domestic thinking
41 Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18
CONN. L. REV. 739, 765 (1986).
41 Id.
45 Id.
44 Will Kymlicka, defending what he terms -group-differentiated rights," has attributed
the decline in the role of minority rights within liberal theory partly to "the increased
influence throughout the world of the American conception of an ethnicity-blind constitu-
tion," which he argues "has been shaped by unique factors (e.g., racial desegregation; the
scope of immigration) which are not necessarily applicable to other countries." Wn.t. KYM-
LICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL. THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 7 (1995).
His comment uncovers the potentially detrimental effects on an international front of
treating U.S. constitutional law as hermetic and sell-contained. See id.; see also Aden° Addis,
Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAMN: L. REV,
615, 635 n.57 (1992) (observing that "N he Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution has generally been read to embody the individualist anti-discrimination (non-
discrimination) principle. Indeed, Equal Protection jurisprudence in the United States has
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about free exercise with the international and political theory perspec-
tive allows for a more thorough consideration of the significance of
group rights, or that of the individual in relation to the group. At the
same time, scholarship in American constitutional law can provide a
method for distinguishing religious from other kinds of groups.
Political theorists addressing the question of what rights vest in
collectivities, rather than in individuals, tend to maintain fairly broad
conceptions of what kinds of groups should be included. Professor
Vernon Van Dyke, an advocate for the protection of group as well as
individual rights, urges "not that the problem of equal treatment for
individuals should be ignored, but that the rule of equal treatment
must be interpreted in the light of a counterpart: that ethnic commu-
nities—as well as states, nations, and 'peoples'—may also have just
claims," defining such ethnic groups as distinguished by their "lan-
guage, race, or religion."45
 Because he discerns no principled way of
differentiating among groups affiliated on the basis of language, race,
or religion, Van Dyke cannot adequately account for the Supreme
Court's holding in Wisconsin v. Yoder; which protected the right of the
Amish to remove their children from public schools after the eighth
grade." According to Van Dyke's analysis, "interestingly enough, the
Supreme Court gave precedence to the right of the religious commu-
nity. But the court acted on the basis of the First Amendment guaran-
tee of freedom of religion, leaving the presumption untouched that
nonreligious ethnic communities do not have a comparable right."47
Approaching Yoder from the vantage point of a defense of liberalism's
capacity to protect groups, Professor Chandran Kukathas likewise ar-
gues that the Free Exercise Clause provided an inadequate basis for
the decision, which should instead have been grounded in a right to
freedom of association." Although fundamentally disagreeing in their
conclusions, neither scholar can discern a reasoned basis for the Con-
stitution's decision to privilege religious over other cultural practices.
had a major influence on the nature of international documents in this area"). The work
of Professor Madhavi Sunder supplies one exception to this deficiency in the area of
scholarship on religious liberty. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399,
1421-22 (2003).
45
 Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory,
in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 31,53 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995).
46
 See generally 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
47 Van Dyke, supra note 45, at 51.
48
 Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
CULTURES, supra note 45, at 228,247.
20061	 The Equal Protection of Free Exercise 	 287
Comparative work, like Peter Danchin's U.S. Unilateralism and the
International Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative,
highlights the anomalous nature of U.S. failure to consider religious
liberty in the context of the rights of minority groups.° As he writes, the
United States' International Religious Freedom Act "creates an irra-
tional hierarchy of human rights in U.S. foreign policy that has negative
implications both domestically and internationally." 50
 International
agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (the "ICCPR"), tend to include provisions securing not only indi-
vidual, but also group-based, religious rights.5 ' Article 18 of the ICCPR,
like the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution, ensures individual
liberties of religious belief and practice:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion. This right shall include freedom to have
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, ei-
ther individually or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, obser-
vance, practice and teaching. 52
Similarly, Article 26 provides individually based guarantees of equal
protection and non-discrimination. 55
 Article 27, however, addresses re-
ligious as well as other minority groups, stating, those States in
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." 54 While
thus illuminating potential relationships among religion, language, and
culture, and approaching religious liberties from both individual and
group perspectives, international and comparative law sources tend not
to examine the respective ontologies of different types of groups or the
Peter Danchin, U.S, Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious Freedom;
The Multilateral Alternative, 41 CoLum. 1. TRANst4AT'L L. 33 (2002).
50 Id. at 103.
51 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Art.
18, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Stipp. No. 16 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1066) [hereinafter
ICCPRI.
52 Id.
53 Id. at Art. 26 ("All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any dis-
crimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against dis-
crimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.").
" Id. at Art. 27.
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normative justifications for advocating group rather than, or in addi-
tion to, individual rights.
There is, however, a more nuanced, intermediate approach be-
tween the group rights emphasis of both political theory and compara-
tive and international law scholarship, on the one hand, and U.S. con-
stitutional law's insistence on the individual, on the other. As Professor
Jacob Levy has argued, groups may be differentiated according to the
kinds of rights claims that they put forth. The nature of the relevant
group is, according to this model, not determined independently, but
rather in connection with the right adduced. 55
 Most related to free ex-
ercise is the category of rights claims he describes as those for exemp-
tions.56
 The role of the group in these cases is that of providing mean-
ing.57
 Often the significance of religious practices will not be immedi-
ately evident to an outside observer; rather, ritual's meaning becomes
apparent through the mediation of an interpretive community. Relig-
ious practices are, to a certain extent, markers of belonging, not only to
a particular faith, but within a certain collectivity, that look both out-
wards (towards other sectors of society) and inwards (towards worship-
pers who will recognize a co-religionist through shared practices). It is
not inevitable that courts will adopt a substantive vision of religious
equality on the basis of examining the relationship between an individ-
ual and his or her religious group, but heeding this connection may be
important in terms of establishing the convertibility of a particular relig-
ious ritual. Whereas a demand for an exemption may seem excessive
when one is not able to translate the meaning of the practice involved
into a different context, the request may no longer appear inordinate
when one can, in fact, see parallels between the exemption at issue and
the privileges granted to majority religions.
55 Jacob T. Levy, Classifying Cultural Rights, in NoMos XXXIX: ETHNICITY AND GROUP
RIGHTS 22, 23-24 (Ian Shapiro 8c Will Kyrnlicka eds., 1997).
56 See id. at 25-29.
57 Id. at 27 (In cases where an exemption is demanded or granted, a practice which
has a distinctive status and meaning in a minority culture is banned, regulated, or com-
pelled because of the very different meaning it has for the majority culture, The exemp-
tion is justified as a recognition of that difference, as an attempt not to unduly burden the
minority culture or religion en route to the law's legitimate goals. As noted, many are de-
fended as part of the freedom to practice and live according to one's religion and seek
their defense in the broader theory of religious freedom, but all defenses of exemptions
stress the distinctive meaning which the practice has for the nondominant group.").
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C. Equal Protection Theories
Recent theories of equal protection—particularly those devel-
oped in the context of antidiscrimination law rather than the Four-
teenth Amendment—supply two valuable insights. First, thirty years
after Professor Fiss's article, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,
scholars and courts have developed a more nuanced vision of the re-
lationship between the individual and the group in antidiscrimination
law.58 Second, debates about the relationship between race and cul-
ture, and suspicions about the attempt to associate them too inti-
mately, can provide an important cautionary lesson for those inter-
ested in protecting the free exercise of religion.
Although Professor Fiss acknowledged that the groups he
identified might cease to exist "RJhrough the process of assimilation,"
and that they did not necessarily have biological roots, he emphasized
that they must be entities with "an independent social identity and exis-
tence," and starkly contrasted an individually based equal protection
jurisprudence with a group-based jurisprudence. 59
 Current critiques of
antidiscrimination law call this dichotomy into question. As Professor
Richard Primus has explained, "the rights of individuals and the status
of groups are intertwined rather than mutually exclusive." 60 Disparate
impact law, according to Primus, possesses elements of individualism as
well as an anti-hierarchical aspect connected with groups. 81 The exam-
ple illustrating this relationship is that of the "bottom-line defense,"
which the Supreme Court rejected in Connecticut v. Teal.° Because
specific individuals are harmed by the disparate impact of a certain part
of the hiring process, and they are not subsequently compensated for
this harm, it will not be a sufficient defense to a disparate impact claim
for an employer to contend that the hiring process as a whole results in
a proportional number of minority employees .°
Groups themselves, when conceived as a unity, may not maintain
their coherence. This becomes evident in Professor Kenji Yoshino's
work entitled Covering, in which he argues that in the case of women,
"covering"—or downplaying rather than altering or hiding an underly-
ing identity—could take two forms, either that of forced feminization
58 See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
59 Fiss, supra note 29, at 155, 156.
60
 Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
	 L.
REV. 493, 552 (2003).
6t Id. at 563.
62 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982); Primus, supra note 60, at 563.
66 Primus, supra note 60, at 563.
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or that of shedding the garb of womanhood.54 Professor Madhavi Sun-
der has likewise begun to explore the complications of dissent within
religious groups, positing that a right to such dissent should be legally
ensured. 65
Thinkers on both the left and right have also tended to translate
religious concerns into cultural ones.66
 Discerning to what extent this
conflation represents a distortion, or to what extent religious prac-
tices can accurately be redescribed as cultural ones, should be a cen-
tral task of any project concerned with elucidating the current status
of religion in constitutional jurisprudence. 67
 It is, furthermore, worth
inquiring why a certain version of multiculturalism might be eagerly
echoed by someone like Justice Scalia.
Although a legal analysis of religion's relation with culture has
not occurred in most recent discussions of religious liberty, a model
may be provided by Professor Richard Ford's recent article on race
entitled Beyond Difference': A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics. 68
Religion is generally distinguished from race in the U.S. constitu-
64 Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 771, 905-13 (2002) (describing the op-
erations of the requirements of both "covering" and "reverse covering" on women). See
generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
5
 See Sunder, supra note 44, at 1465-71 (proposing legal procedures for protecting
dissent within religious and cultural groups).
66
 Compare Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 740
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Justice Souter's case against the statute comes down to
nothing more, therefore, than his third point: the fact that all the residents of the Kiryas
Joel Village School District are Satmars. But all its residents also wear unusual dress, have
unusual civic customs, and have not much to do with people who are culturally different
from them. (The Court recognizes that 'the Sattnars prefer to live together "to facilitate
individual religious observance and maintain social, cultural and religious values," but that
it is not "'against their religion' to interact with others."' ) On what basis does Justice
Souter conclude that it is the theological distinctiveness rather than the cultural distinct-
iveness that was the basis for New York State's decision? The normal assumption would be
that it was the latter, since it was not theology but dress, language, and cultural alienation
that posed the educational problem for the children." (citations omitted)), with Martha
Minow, The Constitution and the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. LJ. 1, 16-17 (1995) (discussing
the Kiryas Joel case in terms of the question of the treatment of the subgroup within the
polity). See generally Sager, supra note 27 (treating the relationship between the free exer-
cise of religion and that of culture).
67
 The deep imbrication of religion with cultural practices emerges in Clifford Geertz's
statement that "all cultural performances are not religious performances" but, simultane-
ously, that "the line between those that are [religious] and artistic, or even political, ones is
often not so easy to draw in practice, for, like social forms, symbolic forms can serve multi-
ple purposes." CLIFFORD GEEstrz, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 87, 113 (1973).
68
 Richard T. Ford, Beyond "Difference": A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in
LErr LEGALISM/LEFF CRITIQUE 38 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); see also
RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL. CULTURE: A CRITIQUE (2005).
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tional context because the Free Exercise Clauie extends to practices
whereas the Equal Protection Clause tends not to safeguard ethnically
associated activities. At the same time, however, Professor Ford's gen-
eral critique of the assimilation of race to ethnicity could apply as well
to the conflation of religion with culture. Several of the legal exam-
ples that he invokes even possess explicit parallels within the context
of religion clause jurisprudence, a circumstance that highlights the
differential relation between race and religion as well as the connec- •
tion of each with culture.
Ford commences with a Section 1981 case under Tide VII of the
Civil Rights Act and the Thirteenth Amendment in which a female em-
ployee claimed that American Airlines' policy of prohibiting certain
workers from wearing corn rows discriminated against her as a black
woman, asserting that this hair style "has been and continues to be part
of the cultural and historical essence of Black American women." 69
Through this scenario, Ford critiques the essentialist concept of cul-
ture, which, by articulating a racial culture, would serve a fundamen-
tally conservative agenda, result in stereotyping, and inhibit change. 70
The most compelling parallel within the arena of religion to the case
Ford selects is presented by recent Rastafarian plaintiffs' allegations
that employers' prohibition of dreadlocks infringed on their rights un-
der the Free Exercise Clause. 7' This connection is additionally compli-
cated by the fact that the Rastafarians' claim could be examined either
from an equal protection or free exercise perspective, as Rastafari iden-
tity comprehends both a racial and religious component." The ques-
tion then arises as to whether the equal protection and free exercise
claims should enjoy different statuses or whether practice should be
privileged more in the religious than the racial context."
Because courts have not upheld Rastafarians' employment dis-
crimination claims under the Free Exercise Clause, 74 a more striking
69
 Ford, supra note 68, at 39.
7° Id. at 52-57.
71 See generally Booth v. Maryland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 394 (I/ Md. 2002).
72 See generally Anna Marie Smith, Rastafari as Resistance and the Ambiguities of Essentialism
in the 'New Social Movements,' in THE MAKING OF POLITICA I. I DEN'ITTIES 171 (Ernesto Laclau
ed., 1994) (discussing Rastafari as an illustration of the essentialist approach to social
movements).
75
 Professor Lawrence Sager has provided one answer to this question—"no." In The
Free Exercise of Culture, he argued in favor of claims to the free exercise of culture, but only
insofar as they, like those for the free exercise of religion, did not assert a special privilege
but instead a right not to be discriminated against. See Sager, supra note 27, at 174-75.
74 See Booth, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 397-99. Interestingly, the question of whether Rastafari-
ans should be exempted from laws against drug dealing on the grounds that such activity is
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disparity is presented by comparing a cultural rights hypothetical that
Ford provides with a similar case decided under the First Amend-
ment. Ford asks the reader to imagine:
iSlocial group x has a number of distinctive social practices,
including ritual animal sacrifice that involves slow torture of
the animal for several days. This group establishes a presence
in a particular town and begins, among other practices, this
ritual. The town council (which does not share group x's cul-
ture) responds with an ordinance outlawing animal sacrifice.
To be sure, the ordinance is directed at the group. But it does
not necessarily reflect prejudice or bias against the group or
its members; after all, the group is actually doing something that
the majority of the town disapproves of and would disapprove
of no matter who did it.. .. But to point this out tells us noth-
ing about how the conflict should be resolved. 75
Although in the cultural rights context it seems less than clear that the
group should prevail, the Church of the Lukumi was able to assert a
successful free exercise claim based not upon the torture of any ani-
mals, but on somewhat similar facts. 76
Finally, Justice Powell's opinion in the Supreme Court's decision
on affirmative action in Regents of the University of California v Bakke plays
a central role in Ford's analysis, displaying a coincidence of conserva-
tism with multiculturalism akin to that generated by Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet.77 According to Ford, ironically, "the 'conserva-
tive victory' in Bakke in no small part encouraged the development and
popularity of that bete noire of American conservatives, contemporary
race-conscious multiculturalism." 78 As Ford demonstrates, Powell's
opinion in Bakke "silently institutionalized an ethnicity model of race
that emphasizes cultural difference over status hierarchy.. .. The result
is that the cultural identity of a racial minority group is foregrounded at
protected as part of the right to the free exercise of religion has been hotly debated in the
British context. See Derek O'Brien, Rastafarianism and the Law, NEW LJ., Apr. 6, 2001, at
509, 509-10. But see contra Ian Loveland, Comment: Religious Drug Use as a Human Right?,
Nnw Lj., jam 19, 2001, at 41, 41.
75 FUR!, supra note 68, at 70.
76 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523-47
(1993). Of course, in the case of the Church of the Lukumi, the ritual animal sacrifice
lacked the slow torture present in Ford's hypothetical. See id.
77 Ford, supra note 68, at 45-49.
75 Id. at 47.
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the expense of the history of racism."79 Bakke thus encouraged minority
groups to emphasize cultural difference, a tendency that may have
caused racial identity increasingly to approximate religious identity.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND FREE EXERCISE: THE HISTORY IN THE STATES
The language of equal protection itself first arose out of the relig-
ious liberty provisions of early state constitutions. Interpretations of
the clauses protecting free exercise in these state constitutions sug-
gested two different understandings of discrimination against relig-
ious practice that would eventually lead to the substantive and formal
conceptions of equality. Furthermore, the implementation of state
constitutional provisions suggested a stronger conception of the gov-
ernment's responsibility for enforcing equality in the area of religion
than the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution was subse-
quently viewed as entailing with respect to race.
Whereas in the federal setting, the courts would later import the
equal protection model from the context of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment into adjudication under the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, in the states, the several conceptions of equal protection arose
inversely out of the constitutional clauses concerning religion and, in
particular, free exercise. Likewise, while the Supreme Court has seem-
ingly used the language of equal protection in discussing religion
through analogy with race, the notions of what equal protection might
mean were initially developed in conjunction not with race, but rather
with religion and free exercise. 8°
A. "Equal Protection" and "Privileges or Immunities "Avant La Lettrc
Several of the early state constitutions insisted upon the rights
of free exercise without discrimination or preference, and some
even explicitly used the language of equal protection in describing
79 Id. at 46.
80
 Professor Hamburger elaborates the intellectual debates surrounding the language
of equal protection in the state constitutions, drawing upon a rich range of contextual
materials; however, he does not explore the state jurisprudence on religious liberty that I
cover in this section. See generally Hamburger, supra note 11. Although Professor (now
Judge) Michael W. McConnell also discusses the state constitutions in The Origins and His-
torical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, he analyzes only those cases arising under
them that involved oaths, religous assessments, and military conscription. See 103 HArtv. L.
REv. 1409,1455-73 (1990).
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the requisite treatment of each individual's religious practice.'"
Presaging the Fourteenth Amendment in yet another respect, some
expressed the sense that a person's civil capacity and privileges, or
privileges and immunities, should remain the same whatever his or
her religious persuasion.82
 Although few cases depended for their
outcome on the constitutional clauses mandating the equal protec-
Al For the language of equal protection, see Mn. CoNST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art.
XXXIII ("That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks
most acceptable to him; all persons, professing the Christian religion, are equally entitled to
protection in their religious liberty, wherefore no person ought by any law to be molested in
his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious
practice ....") (emphasis added). For invocation of religious equality, see VA. CONST. of
1776, Decl. of Rights, § 16 ("]A]ll men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience ...."). For the rhetoric of non-preference and non-
discrimination, see, for example, ALA. CONST. of 1819, Decl. of Rights, § 7 ("{N]o preference
shall ever be given by law to any religious sect, society, denomination, or mode of worship
...."); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 4 ("The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profes-
sion and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this State
...."). John K. Wilson furnishes a table delineating which states provided equal protection
for religious worshippers and to what extent that protection extended outside the bounds of
Protestantism' or Christianity more broadly. John K. Wilson, Religion Under the State Constitu-
tions, 1776-1800, 321 CHURCH & ST. 753, 768 tbl.1 (1990). The table does not, however,
elaborate upon the distinctive phrasing of the various clauses. See id.
82 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, Decl. of Rights, § 6 ("The civil rights, privileges, or capacities
of any citizen, shall in no way be diminished, or enlarged, on account of his religious princi-
ples.") (emphasis added); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX ("[N]o Protestant inhabitant of this
Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on account of his religious
principles, [and all members of Protestant sects] shall fully and freely enjoy every privilege and
immunity, enjoyed by others their fellow-subjects.") (emphasis added); PA. CONST. of 1776,
Decl. of Rights, art. II ("Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly
deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or
peculiar mode of religious worship.") (emphasis added); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII
("[A]ll denominations of Christian Protestants in this State, demeaning themselves peaceably
and faithfully, shall enjoy equal religious and civil privileges.") (emphasis added); VT. CoNsT. of
1786, ch. 1, art III ("[N] or can any man be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen
on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship.") (emphasis
added); see also Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444, 465 (1876) (describing Art. III of the Vermont
Constitution as being "designed ... to secure to every subject equal civil rights, irrespective of
his religious faith; so that his being a Catholic or a Protestant—his being a Calvinist or an
Arminian—his being an orthodox evangelical or a free-thinker—his being a Baptist or a
Universalist—an Episcopalian or a Quaker, should not make him the object of discriminating
legislation or judicial judgment to his disadvantage, as compared with those of different faith
and practice,—so that no law should be aimed or executed against him because he professed
and practiced one form of religious belief or disbelief rather than another, within the limits
of personal immunity consistent with good order and the peace of society under the gov-
ernment"); VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 11 ("No man shall be ... enforced, restrained, mo-
lested or burdened, in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their
opinions in matters of religion, and the same shall in no wise affect, diminish, or enlarge their will
capacities.") (emphasis added).
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tion of individuals in disparate religious groups, Judge Chase, in
his 1799 opinion for the Maryland General Court in the case of
Runkel u Winemiller, granting a writ of mandamus to a minister dis-
possessed of his congregation, emphasized that his determination
rested on the idea that "the pastors, teachers and ministers, of
every denomination of [C]hristians, are equally entitled to the pro-
tection of the law, and to the enjoyment of their religious and tem-
poral rights.."88
 The equal protection of all Christian denomina-
tions under the law meant for Judge Chase, among other things,
that each should be equally bound by, and should equally benefit
from, their respective contractual obligations, regardless of
whether these contractual commitments were internal to church
operations."
The question of whether an individual's civil capacity was dimin-
ished or enlarged on the basis of religion or whether he was deprived
of privileges and immunities accorded to others arose most frequently
in the context of assessing a witness's qualification to testify. 85 In the
early seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke established the principle
in England that only Christians could serve as sworn witnesses. 86 Dur-
ing the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in the states,
disputes persisted about precisely what religious beliefs qualified a
person to testify. Some courts insisted that an oath would be in-
sufficiently binding on anyone who did not believe in the existence of
85 4 H. & McH. 429,450.
84 Id. at 450-51. An equal protection logic also proved decisive in the Georgia Su-
preme Court case of Gilliam & Brown u Wells. 64 Ga. 192 (1879). justice Bleckley's opinion
explained that a town ordinance requiring a licensed liquor store to close whenever "any
denomination of Christian people" held "divine service" was ultra vires, because, "Wu
readers of the constitution and the Code of Georgia, such a phrase as 'any denomination
of Christian people,' is unfamiliar as a legal expression, and the reason is, that the state
treats all religions alike." Id. at 195-98. A dissenting justice, although acknowledging that
"Jew or Gentile, Christian or Pagan, are alike entitled to equal protection under our liberal and
wise toleration of perfect freedom of religious thought, and equality of protection ex-
tended to religious worship" (emphasis added), id. at 200, insisted that it seemed from the
record as though only Christians lived in the particular town, and, hence, that the ordi-
nance was not discriminatory and remained valid, id. at 200-02.
85
 For an interesting modern counterpart presenting equal protection, free exercise,
and establishment clause problems, see Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin' on
Heaven's Door: Rethinking the Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 CORN E1.1. L. Rev. 1090,
1093-1104 (2001).
88
 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, OR, A
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 6b (London, J. & W.T Clarke 19th ed. 1832) (1628).
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an afterlife furnished with rewards and punishments 8 7 Others held
that all who believed in the existence of a God who would punish
those swearing falsely could serve as witnesses. 88 In Virginia, the Gen-
eral Court reasoned that an individual who refused to acknowledge a
future state of punishments and rewards could not be considered in-
competent as a witness because to do so would be to lessen his civil
capacity on the basis of religion. 88
At the same time, however, these constitutions refused to grant
any absolute liberty of practice—as opposed to conscience. They em-
phasized that the public order and peace might be disrupted by per-
mitting complete freedom of religious exercise. In the language of
Thomas Cooley's influential treatise on Constitutional Limitations,
[T]he general voice has been, that persons of every religious
persuasion should be made equal before the law, and that
questions of religious belief and religious worship should be
questions between each individual man and his Maker. Of
these questions human tribunals, so long as the public order is
not disturbed, are not to take cognizance . . . ."9°
87 See Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66, 71 (1828) (holding that a Universalist, who
"denield] all punishment after this life, and who ... believes that men will be punished in
this life for their sins, but immediately after their death, be made happy," was not a compe-
tent witness).
88 See Butts v. Swartwood, 2 Cow. 431, 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (holding that a Univer-
salist was competent to testily despite not believing in the eternity of future punishment);
Blair v. Seaver, 26 Pa. 274, 277 (1856) ("The test of competency is, whether the witness
believes in the existence of a God, who will punish him if he swear falsely ... As an oath is
a solemn appeal to the Creator of the Universe that the truth only shall be witnessed, no -
one is competent to take it who has not a religious sense of accountability to the Omnis-
cient Being, who will certainly punish him if he commits perjury. But whether the punish-
ment will be temporary or eternal, inflicted in this world or that to come, is immaterial
upon the question of competency.").
89 See Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 632, 642-44 (1846) (construing the
1776 Bill of Rights, which the first article of the 1830 Virginia Constitution incorporated);
see also Bush v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 244, 249-50(1882) (holding that the sixth section of
the Kentucky Bill of Rights, which specified "RI hat the civil rights, privileges, or capacities
of any citizen shall in nowise be diminished or enlarged on account of his religion," Is a
declaration of an absolute equality, which is violated when one class of citizens is held to
have the civil capacity to testify in a court of justice because they entertain a certain opin-
ion in regard to religion, while another class is denied to possess that capacity because they
do not conform to the prescribed belief").
90 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL. LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 960 (8th ed.
1927) (emphasis added).
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The attempt to discern when the grant of equality before the law to
all devout persons would infringe upon the state's interest in public
order led ultimately to the fear the Supreme Court expressed in
Reynolds v. United States of the religious individual who might become
"a law unto himself."91
 The route was not, however, inevitable from
the state constitutional clauses limiting free exercise to the rationale
for the decisions in the polygamy cases and the Court's emphasis on
the legitimacy of general laws despite the burdens they might place
upon particular religious practices. Reynolds, and Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith in the next cen-
tury, represented, rather, the conflation between restricting activities
likely to harm others or generate a public disturbance and prohibit-
ing any activity that would violate a general law, whatever the basis
for that law's enactment. Although Reynolds might have found a
justification within the state constitutional clauses specifying that
religious liberty could not extend as far as the propagation of licen-
tiousness, 92
 the more sweeping principle that it asserts—and that
Smith followed—is not entirely in accord with the spirit of the state
constitutional limitations provisions. Most of these, rather than sim-
ply invoking restrictions placed by positive law, specified particular
ways in which religious practice,
 might prove problematic for other
individuals and the state in general,"
The most common of the state constitutional limitations in-
volved infringement of the rights of others," disturbance of the
91 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.,145, 167 (1878); see also infra notes 166-75 and
accompanying text.
92 See CAE CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 4 ("[Blut the liberty of conscience, hereby secured,
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent
with the peace or safety of the state.") (emphasis added).
93
 Scholars today continue to debate whether Reynolds/ Smith or, in Professor (now Judge)
Michael McConnell's language, a "freedom-Protective" approach, is more consistent with the
language of these state constitutions. See McConnell, supra note 31, at 820; McConnell, supra
note 80, at 1461-67. While Justice Scalia and Professors Philip Hamburger and Marci Hamil-
ton support the historical accuracy of the principle articulated in Smith, Judge McConnell
and Justice O'Connor take the other approach. See Thomas C. Berg, Commentary, The Volun-
tary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and Now, 2004 BYU L. RF.v. 1593, 1607-08. One of
the central questions, of which Judge McConnell provides a detailed analysis, involves what
constituted a "disturbance of the peace" in the late eighteenth century. See McConnell, supra
note 31, at 832-46 (arguing that both Justice Scalia's and Professor Hamburger's insistence
upon an expansive meaning of disturbing the peace are unpersuasive, and that, in any event,
they fit the language of only some of the state constitutions).
94 See Mn. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. XXXIII (restricting the freedom of
practice when, "under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace or
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peace of the State, 95
 and the pursuit of treason and sedition. 99
Several examples demonstrate that the ways in which these clauses
were construed were not isomorphic with restrictions based simply
upon general laws. In Lindenmuller v. People, the New York Supreme
Court upheld a law prohibiting theatrical performances on Sun-
days.97
 Although sustaining the statute primarily as a civil regula-
tion, the court first elaborated upon the alternative justification for
Sunday laws as derived from the notion that Christianity remained,
in a certain sense, part of the common law.98
 Under this reasoning,
the state was justified in eliminating Sunday theater on the grounds
that dramatic productions would infringe "the equal rights of oth-
ers"99—that is, Christians' ability to worship undisturbed—and that
they would cause disturbance of the "public peace" in a manner
safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil,
or religious rights") (emphasis added).
95 See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LV1 ("All persons whatever shall have the free
exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of the
State ...."); NJ. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX (IT] here shall be no establishment of any
one religious sect in this Province, in preference to another ... but ... all persons, pro-
fessing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect, who shall demean themselves peaceably
under the government as hereby established, shall be capable of being elected into any
office of profit or trust ... and shall fully and freely enjoy every privilege and immunity
enjoyed by others their fellow-subjects.") (emphasis added). In Separating Church and
State: Roger Williams and Religious Liberty, Timothy Hall elaborates upon Roger Williams'
response to claims that civil peace could be maintained only through an insistence on
religious orthodoxy. TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WIL-
LIAMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 79-86 (1998). Williams endorsed a less restrictive notion
of peace—one capable of comprehending conflict over religious doctrine—and instead
emphasized "civility". Id.
96 See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV ("[T]here shall be no establishment of any one
religious church or denomination in this State, in preference to any other ... but all per-
sons shall be at liberty to exercise their own mode of worship:—Provided, That nothing
herein contained shall be construed to exempt preachers of treasonable or seditious dis-
courses, from legal trial and punishment.")
97 21 How. Pr. 156, 164-65, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861).
98 See id. at 158-64. For discussion of this maxim, and its lack of substantive con-
tent, see Stuart Banner, When Christianity Was Part of the Common Law, 16 L. & HIST.
REV. 27 (1998).
99 See Lindenmuiler, 21 How. Pr. at 157 ("Individual consciences may not be enforced;
but men of every opinion and creed may be restrained from acts which interfere with
christian worship, and which tend to revile religion and bring it into contempt. The belief
of no man can be constrained, and the proper expression of religious belief is guaranteed
to all; but this right, like every other right, must be exercised with strict regard to the equal
rights of others; and when religious belief or unbelief leads to acts which interfere with the
religious worship, and rights of conscience of those who represent the religion of the
country, as established, not by law, but by the consent and usage of the community, and
existing before the organization of the government, their acts may be restrained by legisla-
tion, even if they are not indictable at common law.").
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similar to blasphemy.'" Although the legislature was entitled to re-
strict non-religious activities on Sundays without violating the state
constitutional protection of free exercise, the court's reasoning in-
dicated that the lawmakers should keep in view the purpose of Sun-
day laws—including the equal rights of others and the state's inter-
est in public peace—when passing them.ioi
In upholding the blaspheniy prosecution of Abner Kneeland,
who had published a declaration attacking the beliefs of Univer-
salists—a minority religion in Massachusettsm—and denying the exis-
tence of God, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts also justified his decision by appealing to the
need to maintain the peace of society.'" Although Kneeland argued
that his statements had simply served to criticize the doctrines of Uni-
,
versalism and to highlight his own religious views by juxtaposition, the
court determined that he had rejected God more generally. 104 The
opinion then attempted to reconcile the state constitution's assertion
of religious freedom with the blasphemy statute:
um See id. at 164-65 ("Upon this ground the law in question could be sustained, for the
legislature are sole judges of the acts proper to be prohibited, with a view to the public
peace, and as obstructing religious worship, and bringing into contempt the religious insti-
tutions of the people."). .
" Contrast this vision of the "equal rights of others" with that expressed by the Su-
preme Court in Davis v. Reason. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. It is worth not-
ing that the 1777 New York Constitution did not contain the phrase "equal rights of oth-
ers," although such language was present in other early state constitutions. The New York
Constitution simply specified that "the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be
so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this State." N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII.
lot Religious establishment persisted in Massachusetts until quite late, and was aban-
doned only in 1832, with the eleventh amendment to the constitution, which specified,
among other things, that "all religious sects and denominations, demeaning themselves
peaceably, and as good citizens of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the protec-
tion of the law; and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall
ever be established by law." jAcon G. MEYER, CHURCH AND STATE IN MASSACHUSF.TTS FROM
1740 To 1833, at 218-20,243 (1930). Although the official state religion was the Congrega-
tional Church prior to disestablishment, a schism between Unitarians and Trinitarians had
long prevented the church from presenting a unified front. Id. at 160-83. The Univer-
salists, who refused to accept the idea of eternal punishment in the afterlife and were not
part of the established church, had fought for religious freedom from early in the history
of the commonwealth. Id. at 121-23. It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that Kneeland's
prosecution for blasphemy was based upon his pronouncements against the Universalists.
103
 Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. L(20 Pick.) 206,220-21,242 (1838). For materials
on the Kneeland case, see generally BLASPHEMY IN MAssActiusErrs: FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
AND THE ABNER KNEE LAND CASE: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1973).
104 Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick) at 209,213-18.
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[U]nderstanding the statute ... as we do, and as we have al-
ready explained it, that it is not intended to prevent or re-
strain the formation of any opinions or the profession of any
religious sentiments whatever, but to restrain and punish acts
which have a tendency to disturb the public peace, it is not
repugnant to, but entirely consistent with, [the religious lib-
erty article] of the Declaration of Rights. 105
In order to remain within the parameters of the state constitution, Jus-
tice Shaw construed the blasphemy statute as applying only to state-
ments made with the intent to harm or give offense to others:
I have come to the conclusion, that [the statute] was not in-
tended to punish a denial of the existence of God; but only
such denial when made in a manner calculated to give just
offence to others, and with a bad intent. With this interpre-
tation the statute is in harmony with the constitution.w 6
Both Lindenmuller and Kneeland indicate that preserving the peace of
the state through, in particular, maintaining respect for other individu-
als' "equal rights," underlay certain of the limitations placed upon free
exercise in the states. 107
The vision of the equal protection of free exercise articulated by
these state constitutions and the decisions under them thus remained
constrained by certain limitations. What they did, however, accomplish
was to make equal protection approaches to free exercise rhetorically
accessible before this way of thinking was available on the federal level.
B. Two Versions of "Discrimination"
Disparities among the state constitutional religion clauses and
their interpretations also brought to the fore several different under-
standings of "discrimination" itself, and the harm that it occasions. The
principal distinction lay between, first, considering any unequal burden
placed upon different religious denominations to be discriminatory,
105 Id. at 221. The applicable constitutional provision asserted that "no subject shall be
hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, or for his relig-
ious profession or sentiments, provided he doth not disturb the public peace or obstruct
others in their religious worship." MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 2.
106 Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) at 242-43.
I" This is consistent with judge McConnell's articulation of the principles underlying
the early state constitutions and his assertion that, "[wlhere the rights of others are not
involved, ... the free exercise right prevails." McConnell, supra note 80, at 1464.
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and, second, deeming discriminatory only those laws specifically aimed
at discouraging a particular religious practice. These two categories
presage the eventual development of formal and substantive ap-
proaches to equality. The differences are most clearly instantiated in
the state courts' treatment of Sunday laws and exemptions from their
applicability.' 08
Although most judicial decisions upheld the validity of laws bar-
ring Sunday employment against free exercise challenges,'°9 largely .
on the ground that they were authorized by the state police power,
the reasoning in the 1858 California case, Ex parte Newman,n° which
was overruled by Ex parte Andrews," suggests an alternative logic. In
Ex parte Newman, the California Supreme Court sustained a Jewish
clothing seller's state constitutional challenge under habeas corpus to
a law "for the better observance of the Sabbath" under which he was
convicted.H 2
 The three opinions in the case articulate several of the
major available positions on Sunday laws. Chief Justice Terry opined
108 For a comprehensive survey and discussion of Sunday laws in the nineteenth cen-
tury, see Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century, 64 Aut. L. Ray. 675 (2000).
Baptist minister John Leland also contended that Sunday laws violated equal protection,
and claimed in an 1815 pamphlet that "I[gJovernment should be so formed as to adminis-
ter equal protection to all the citizens within its limits. It is not only supposable, but fact,
that within our government, therd are Jews, Turks, and Christians of various peculiarities,
as well as those who believe in no revealed religion. Local situation has placed them to-
gether—their interests and fears are common. All of diem have life, rights and property to
be secured—they associate for mutual defence, and from what is called government; for
the support of which each one pays his equal part. In this case, ought not government to
be a nursing father to all of them?" Carl Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State
Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1519.
109 See, e.g., Ex parte Koser, 60 Cal. 177, 197 (1882) (en banc) (McKee, J., concurring)
(affirming the validity of a law penalizing the act of keeping certain businesses open on
Sundays on the ground that "every citizen of the State is left free to his intellectual convic-
tions and emotional fervors upon subjects of the unknown and unknowable. All are equal in
the laws, in positions under the law, and in the administration of the Government. No
legal distinction or discrimination can be made between them. But, thus protected, all are
subject to the municipal institutions established by the State. And in establishing a day of
rest as one of those institutions, the State has the right to determine what day ought to be
set apart for that purpose, and how it ought to be observed by the people"); Ex parte An-
drews, 18 Cal. 678, 685 (1861) (upholding the validity of a Sunday law as a "civil regula-
tion" and determining that "[t]he mere fact that this regulation takes effect upon a day
which has been appropriated as a day of rest by the sanctions of a particular church, no
more destroys the power of the Legislature to command abstinence from labor on that
day, than the fact that if the Legislature appointed certain public business to be done on
Saturday or Sunday—this would have been 'discriminating' against the sects, according
religious sanctity to those days"); Lindenmuller, 21 How. Pr at 164-65, 175.
"fi 9 Cal. 502 (1858), overruled in part by Ex parte. Andrews, 18 Cal. 678 (1861).
I 18 Cal. at 678.
1129 Cal. at 504-10.
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that the law did, in fact, discriminate against religious denominations
that did not observe the Christian Sabbath." 3 Although also resisting
the statute on constitutional grounds, Justice Burnett reasoned that it
created an impermissible establishment of religion, which violated the
rights of Christians as well as Jews, because under it, the Christian is
"compel[led] ... to do that which he has the right to omit if he
pleases."" 4 Finally, Justice Field, then a member of the California Su-
preme Court, in dissent, insisted that the law remained a valid civil
regulation, justifiable on the secular basis of the human need for "pe-
riodical cessations from labor," which simply happened to coincide
with the Christian Sabbath." 3
For Chief Justice Terry, the Sunday law recognized the sanctity of
the Christian Sabbath, but not that of other religions, including Juda-
ism, and, therefore, was discriminatory." 6 As he explained:
In a community composed of persons of various religious
denominations, having different days of worship, each con-
sidering his own as sacred from secular employment, all be-
ing equally considered and protected under the Constitution, a
law is passed which in effect recognizes the sacred character
of one of these days, by compelling all others to abstain from
secular employment, which is precisely one of the modes in
which its observance is manifested and required by the creed
of that sect to which it belongs as a Sabbath. Is not this a dis-
crimination in favor of the one? Does it require more than
an appeal to one's common sense to decide that this is a
preference? ... We think not .... 117
In this case, the mere recognition of Sunday as a weekly holiday con-
stituted discrimination against non-Christian sects, without the addi-
tional requirement that these groups be specially burdened by en-
forced observance. Under this account, it would make little difference
if the other religious groups were Saturday Sabbatarians or instead
refrained from celebrating any day of rest.
The significance of the additional burden potentially placed upon
those who observe a different Sabbath by the obligation to rest on Sun-
113 Id.
114 Id. at 513-14.
115
 Id. at 519-20.
116 Id. at 506.
117 Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. at 506 (emphasis added).
2006]	 The Equal Protection of Free Exercise 	 303
days emerged only with Justice Sharpstein's dissent in Ex parte Koser.H8
In his opinion, Justice Sharpstein discussed the inconvenience and
economic constraints experienced by those who were forced to main-
tain not only the Sabbath designated by their own religion but also to
take off on Sunday.ng Noting that the California Constitution guaran-
tees protection "in the exercise and enjoyment of religious worship
without discrimination or preference," he elaborated that:
[A] law which does not bear equally upon all classes of people
is not without discrimination or preference. ... It is no answer
to this objection [about losing two days of the week rather
than one] to say that the law ignores religion altogether, be-
cause the Legislature has no right under the Constitution to
ignore religion when passing laws which must seriously affect
those who profess it in some one of its various forms. If it is
only necessary that the people of this State should rest one
day in seven, and wholly immaterial on what day of the week
they rest, those whose religion requires them to rest on a day
other than that designated in the Sunday law, should have
been excepted from its operation in order to avoid discrimi-
nation or preference which the Constitution forbids. 12°
Although this argument was not resonant with the logic of the major-
ity, Justice Sharpstein's dissent in Ex parte Koser finally articulated the
notion that Sunday laws might place an additional burden on those
sects observing the Sabbath on a different day.
Justice Field's dissent in Ex parte Newman, the reasoning of which
was ultimately adopted by the California Supreme Court in Ex parte
Andrews, provides an anticipatory response to Justice Sharpstein's
opinion in Koser as well as countering that of Chief Justice Terry in Ex
parte Newman itself. 121
 Rather than rejecting the logic of burdening—a
position that would have been inconsistent with his subsequent state-
ments in Ho Alt Kow122—Justice Field instead insisted that the law did
not, in fact, burden the actual religious practice of those who cele-
brated another Sabbath, but only inconvenienced them by requiring
" 8 See 60 Cal. 177,207-15 (1882) (Sharpstein, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 208-09.
128 Id. at 209.
121
 See Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. at 518-29.
122 See infra notes 176-91 and accompanying text.
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them to refrain from working on another day. 123
 As Justice Field main-
tained:
The law treats of business matters, not religious duties. In
fixing a day of rest, it establishes only a rule of civil conduct.
In limiting its command to secular pursuits, it necessarily
leaves religious profession and worship free. It is absurd to
say that the sale of clothing, or other goods, on Sunday, is an
act of religion or worship; and it follows that the inhibition
of such sale does not interfere with either. 124
For Justice Field, the mere fact that Saturday Sabbatarians might be
economically inconvenienced by the necessity of closing shop on Sun-
day did not rise to the level of a burden on religious practice. 125 One
might here contrast such Sunday laws with a regulation forbidding
shop owners from closing their stores on Saturdays or at least directly
penalizing the choice not to remain open that day. Nor did Field's sub-
sequent opinions while a Supreme Court Justice suggest a significant
change in his stance.' 26
The various positions articulated in Ex parte Newman, Ex parte An-
drews, and Ex parte Koser assisted in developing the sense of what might
constitute an impermissibly discriminatory burden on a particular re-
ligious practice. Whereas Justice Sharpstein reasoned that Sunday clos-
ing laws burdened Saturday Sabbatarians by disadvantaging them eco-
nomically,'" Justice Field insisted that burdens arose only from laws
that affected specifically religious exercise. 128
 For Justice Field, Sunday
laws were acceptable neutral laws of general applicability precisely be-
cause they did not place a restriction on any sect's free exercise—as
they might have had an individual claimed a religious obligation to
work on Sundays. 129
 In later jurisprudence, Justice Field's understand-
ing of the contours of a burden on religion, which required some di-
rect impact on the individual's actual religious practice, came to domi-
nate.'" Indeed, it began to seem more appropriate to consider the
123
 Ex parte Neuman, 9 Cal. at 519.
124 Id.
122 a
12(1 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890) ("To call {Mormons'] advocacy [of
polygamy] a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind.").
127
	 supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
tz8 See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
130 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (maintaining, in the context of a
free exercise challenge to a Sunday law that, "[do strike down, without the most critical
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validity of Sunday laws in terms of the establishment of religion rather
than in terms of the burdens placed upon free exercise. 131
 The early
state deliberations, however, helped jurists begin to contemplate what
constituted burdening religious practice and to evaluate its constitu-
tionality.
The states likewise demonstrated a lack of consensus as to whether
it would be better to protect certain minority religions through specific
constitutional or legislative provisions aimed at assisting them or simply
by extending non-preferential treatment more broadly.' 32 Several prob-
lems plagued the attempt to give particularized accommodation to mi-
nority religions through granting exemptions. First, there were practi-
cal impediments. The enumeration of certain sects sometimes left
others without recourse.' Likewise, the possibility that religious
groups that were initially marginalized might eventually become domi-
nant forces within a state rendered it undesirable to enshrine a privi-
lege for a specific sect within the constitution.
Second, jurisprudential concerns often intervened. Not all of the
state courts considered exemptions consistent with,their constitutions.
Those unaccustomed to viewing as discriminatory an unequal burden
placed upon one group's religious practice might assess an attempt to
scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e.,
legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically re-
strict the operating latitude of the legislature").
131 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-53 (1961) (analyzing the validity of a
Maryland Sunday law in the context of an Establishment Clause challenge and upholding
the statute).
132
 For example, the Maryland Constitttion specified that "the people called Quakers,
those called Dunkers, and those called Metionists, holding it unlawful to take an oath on
any occasion, ought to be allowed to make their solemn affirmation, in the manner that
Quakers have been heretofore allowed to affirm; and to be of the same avail as an oath, in
all such cases, as the affirmation of Quakers hath been allowed and accepted within this
State, instead of an oath." Mu. CONST. of 1776, Decl. of Rights, art. XXXVI. A constitu-
tional amendment in 1795 extended additional protections to the same groups, granting
individuals within them the ability to substitute an affirmation for an oath of office. Mu.
CoNs•r. of 1776, art. III (amended 1795). The enumeration of particular sects in this ex-
ception proved important in the case of Shane v. Clarke, in which the court granted a new
trial because one juror had not taken an oath, and was not a "quaker, menonist, or
dunker." 3 H. & McH. 101, 101 (Md. 1792). An alternative approach to the one that the
Maryland Constitution adopted would have been to permit anyone with a religious objec-
tion to substitute an affirmation for the oath.
123
 For example, in early Massachusetts, although the Baptists and the Quakers were
exempted from some of the requirements of religious establishment, the "Separates," who
were dissidents from the colony's Congregational church, were not. See MEYER, supra note
102, at 33.
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eliminate it as itself violating the principle of equality )54 Thus in City
of Shreveport v. Lag, the Louisiana Supreme Court invalidated a Sun-
day ordinance that provided an exception for those who observed the
Sabbath on Saturday. 135 In doing so, the court explained, "[b]efore
the constitution Jews and Gentiles are equal; by the law they must be
treated alike, and the ordinance of a City Council which gives to one
sect a privilege which it denies to another, violates both the constitu-
tion and the law, and is therefore null and void." 136 Although
Shreveport's enactment was composed in general terms, the record
demonstrated that the city possessed a significantly sized Jewish com-
munity that did business on Sundays, and the court interpreted the
ordinance as aimed at assisting that group.'" A concern that the court
did not voice, but could have, is that the law protected only Saturday
Sabbatarians, not those who might worship on alternate days.
Significantly, the Shreveport decision occurred under the Louisiana
state Constitution of 1868, imposed during Reconstruction.'" This
document contained a number of equal rights provisions that were
eliminated with the retrenchment of Reconstruction and the imple-
mentation of a new state constitution in 1879. 139 The emphasis—or,
one might even suggest, overemphasis—on equality in the Shreveport
case thus potentially reflected a new kind of relation between claims to
religious liberty and those against racially-based discrimination.
Whereas most of the state constitutions, and decisions under them,
employed an equal protection approach derived initially from the free
exercise context, the outcome in Shreveport, like some of the Supreme
Court's religious liberty cases following the Fourteenth Amendment,
may have been indebted partly to developments in race-based equal
protection adjudication.
C. State Enforcement of Free Exercise
Finally, questions about the appropriate scope of the states' actions
in ensuring nondiscriminatory treatment of various religious groups
1" See King, supra note 108, at 704-06.
155 26 La. Ann. 671,671-72 (1874).
139 Id. at 672.
137 See id. at 671-72.
138 See LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOU ISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE OAHE 8-9
(1991).
139 Id. at 8-10.
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surfaced frequently. 14° The primary battleground involved the extent to
which states should concern themselves with religious discrimination
against, or harms to, a particular religious individual or group caused
by another private person, whether through disruption of religious
services, uttering blasphemous statements, or operating a business on
Sundays. Debates about whether the government's attempts to protect
religious liberty should extend to regulating such private conduct were
also connected with concerns about delineating the spheres of private
and public with respect to religion. Religious practice—and the de-
mand for toleration—has always raised questions about the extent to
which religion can be relegated to the private arena. As Professor Mor-
ton Horwitz remarked, even in the seventeenth century, natural rights
theories and the corresponding assertion of a private sphere provided a
"basis for arguing for religious toleration" and for "setting limits on
state power" over "religious conscience."141
 Today, critics question the
extent to which religious communities organized through the "private"
mechanisms of property ownership, family relations, and education—
such as those of the Satmar Hasidim—should be deemed immune
from intervention by the state. 142
In the early states, however, there remained considerable ambigu-
ity over the degree to which religious worship could be deemed purely
private. The South Carolina Constitution not only articulated the crite-
ria that Protestant sects needed to meet to be recognized as part of the
state's established church, but also included as one of the requirements
that "God is publicly to be worshipped." 143 This demand was connected
140 In Equality and Diversity, Professor Hamburger suggests that, "in the absence of
some constitutional or other positive law providing a legal right to equal protection,
Americans did not consider the 'right' of equal protection legally enforceable." Ham-
burger, supra note 11, at 378. The cases discussed in this Section may suggest one way in
which the equality of free exercise was considered enforceable by the states.
141
 Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423, 1423 (1982).
142
 For a compelling analysis of the public/private distinction with respect to the Sat-
mar Hasidim and the reluctance of both liberals and communitarians to apply the realist
critique of economic relations to the internal dynamics of private cultural and religious
groups, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Tale of Two Villages (Ox Legal Realism Comes to 'Awn),
in NOMOS XXXIX: ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 290, 313-20 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kym-
licka eds., 1997).
145
 S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII. These specifications did not originate with the
South Carolina Constitution of 1778, but rather dated back in large part to the Fundamen-
tal Constitutions of Carolina, authorship of which has been attributed to John Locke, d-
though not without controversy. See Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, § 94, 96, 99
(Jan. 12, 1681). See generally James Lowell Underwood, The Dawn of Religious Freedom in
South Carolina: The Journey from Limited Tolerance to Constitutional Right, 54 S.C. L. REV. I 11
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with a claim for the validity of public establishment and concomitant
taxation for religious purposes, but public worship was not inevitably
bound up with these other appurtenances of state-sponsored religion.
Indeed, in Massachusetts, at least one minister argued against estab-
lishment, while at the same time defending laws sustaining public wor-
ship on the ground that they were "absolutely necessary for the well-
being of civil society." 1 '14
 The requirement in many of the state constitu-
tions that religious worship not disrupt the peace of the state or inter-
fere with the processes of government, however, furnished an outer
limit on the public performance of religious acts.'"
While blasphemy furnished one - area in which the potential harms
to other individuals' religious sentiments motivated state prosecu-
tions,'" it was in the treatment of the disruption of religious services
that the question of when the state should act to preserve religious lib-
erty arose most dramatically.' 47
 In these contexts, the courts of several
states, at the same time as affirming a principle of non-preference and
opposing establishment, insisted that the state should still concern itself
with ensuring the sanctity of worship where it did occur.l']s Thus relig-
ious practice, despite taking place within a seemingly "private" domain,
was entitled to public protection.
In State v. faspel; the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
misdemeanor conviction of an individual who had disrupted a Baptist
meeting by "laughing and talking in a loud voice, and divers indecent
actions and grimaces, during the performance of divine service."'"
The court explained that the North Carolina Constitution's Bill of
Rights insisted that "there shall be no establishment of any religious
church in preference to another" and that "all persons shall be at lib-
erty to exercise their own mode of worship."15° The constitution did not
establish liberty of worship as a positive law, but rather merely declared
(2002) (outlining the development from the Fundamental Constitutions to South Caro-
lina's 1790 Constitution). On at least one point, the Fundamental Constitutions displayed
a more ecumenical spirit than the 1778 document; Article 96 invited the settlement of
"Jews, Heathens, and other Dissenters" by permitting "any seven or more persons agreeing
in any religion" to "constitute a church or profession." See Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolina, § 96 ( Jan. 12, 1681) (italicization omitted). The 1790 version ultimately aban-
doned establishment. Underwood, supra, at 166-70.
199
	 supra note 102, at 98-99.
145 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
146
 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
147 See infra notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
148
 See infra notes 149-62 and accompanying text.
199 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 323, 324 (1833).
150 Id.
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this liberty of worship as a preexisting natural right.' 51
 The court never-
theless concluded that protecting the designated freedom from private
as well as state-sponsored incursions was essential. 152 Moreover, religious
collectivities, as well as individuals, deserved such protection, because
the clause protecting free exercise comprehended both private relig-
ious practice and "public worship in assemblies." 1 " According to the
court:
While therefore no church shall be established in preference
to another, all churches are established for the purposes of
the security of the worshippers from penalties, or from mo-
lestation in the act of worship. The guaranty of religious
freedom to all the citizens, supposes each one of them to
have an interest in it, and to be conscious of religious obliga-
tion; and the quiet of the body politic demands that the re-
ligion which the citizens profess, and which it is supposed
they would profess even against the laws of human institu-
tion, may be safely professed, and sincerely exercised in pub-
lic assemblies.... [T]he exercise of religious worship calls
together large multitudes, whose assembly is lawful, and a
duty in a religious sense, and a public duty in the sense of
the Constitution, the disturbance of whom, has an immedi-
ate tendency to bitter discords, the violent commotion of
neighborhoods, and a breach of the peace ... . 154
Even in the absence of any explicit legislative enactment criminalizing
the disruption of religious services, the court concluded, the state
constitutional guarantee of free exercise rendered the indictment valid
and a necessary means of preserving religious liberty.' 55
Although not criminalizing the conduct disruptive of religious
worship, the New York Supreme Court employed a similar logic in
Wall v. Lee. 156
 In a homily, Lee, the pastor of a Catholic church, cast
some aspersions upon a dance that had recently occurred in the
community, Later, when the collection was being taken up at the end
of Mass, Wall—who seems to have been a participant in the dance-
151 Id.
155 See id.
' 53 Id. at 324-25.
154 Jasper 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) at 329-25.
155 See id. at 324-25.
155 See 34 N.Y. 141,141-46 (1865).
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demanded that Lee rescind his statements about the event. 157 When
Lee categorically refused, a quarrel ensued and the pastor attempted
to force Wall physically from the premises.' 58
 Despite Lee's lack of
success in evicting Wall, the latter sued the former for assault and bat-
tery and won a jury verdict in his favor. 159
 On appeal, the court re-
versed because, as leader of the assembly, Lee possessed the right to
remove Wa11. 160
 According to the court, "usage and custom have made
it peculiarly the duty of the minister, or priest, to conduct the services
of religious meetings, to preside over them, to preserve order therein,
and act as the organ or spokesman of the congregation." 161 The
significance of the opinion derives, however, from the fact that the
court then explained, with reference to the federal, not the state, con-
stitution, that "[t] he guaranty ... of the free exercise of religious
opinion, and the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and peti-
tion for a redress of grievances, would be but an idle mockery if meet-
ings convened for such purposes can be invaded and disturbed with
im pun i ty."162 The
 principle that the North Carolina Supreme Court
articulated with respect to its state constitution was associated by its
New York counterpart with enforcement of the federal constitutional
guarantee of free exercise.t 65
157
 Id. at 141.
158 Id.
159
 Id. at 141-42.
168 Id. at 146.
161 Wall, 34 N.Y. at 146.
1" Id.
165 See Jasper, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) at 324-25; Wall, 34 N.Y. at 146. This reference to the fed-
eral constitutional guarantee of free exercise before the First Amendment was officially
incorporated against the states may not be as exceptional as it might seem. The Georgia
Supreme Court, in dicta from an 1852 case, indicated a belief that the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution also bound the several states:
That the power to pass any law infringing on these principles, is taken from
the Federal Government, no one denies. But is it a part of the reserved rights
of a State to do this? May the Legislature of a State, for example, unless re-
strained by its own Constitution, pass a law "respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ?" If so, of what avail, I ask,
is the negation of these powers to the General Government? Our revolution-
ary sires wisely resolved that religion should be purely voluntary in this coun-
try; that it should subsist by its own omnipotence, or come to nothing. Hence,
they solemnly determined that there should be no church established by law,
and maintained by the secular power. Now, the doctrine is, that Congress may
not exercise this power, but that each State Legislature may do so for itself. As
if a National religion and State religion, a National press and State press, were
quite separate and distinct from each other; and that the one might be sub-
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The expansive vision of when the state should act to protect free
exercise evinced by these cases may have arisen partly out of the need
to preserve the meetings of religious dissidents from interruption by
members of a majority faith, but they also indicate an indistinction
between the public and private spheres with respect precisely to relig-
ion. For these early states, the enforcement of free exercise was not
exclusively a protection of individual practice, but rather protected a
collective worship in which the individual clearly possessed an impor-
tant, but not dominant, role. In contrast to the image of laws proce-
durally protecting dissent within the context of particular religious
groups that Professor Madhavi Sunder has presented, these cases dis-
play a judicial will to assist in the disciplining of a congregation
through imposition of the extra weight of law.Im Although, from the
contemporary vantage point, this governmental intervention into the
religious sphere may seem overly intrusive, it does demonstrate an
attempt to affirmatively protect religious liberty and free exercise in a
manner that has subsequently been eschewed not only in the religious
context but also in some areas of civil rights.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND FREE EXERCISE: TRACING
Two FEDERAL APPROACHES
The evolution of equal protection approaches to free exercise in
the federal context diverged from that in the states, but there remained
some echoes: for example, the question again arose of whether a bur-
den placed upon religious exercise constitutes discrimination against
the individual claiming a right to such practice. 165
 By contrast, the fed-
eral reluctance to enforce guarantees of either equal protection or free
exercise against private parties stood in contrast to the experience of
the states. At the same time, on the federal level, courts increasingly
considered the individual in relation to the group in evaluating free
exercise claims.
Adhering to the contention that, in general, religion clause doc-
trine has, on the federal level, evolved out of developments in equal
protection adjudication, this Part first contends that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment produced an increased
ject to control, but the other notl Such logic, I must confess, fails to com-
mend itself to my judgment.
Campbell v. Georgia, 11 Ga. 353,365-66 (1852).
' 64 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
' 65 See supra notes 108-39 and accompanying text.
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awareness of the relationship between the individual and group
within free exercise jurisprudence and that a divergence arose be-
tween religion clause cases decided with greater and lesser awareness
of the collectivity behind particular religious liberty claims. It then
discusses the analogies and discrepancies that arise out of the attempt
to map religion clause tests onto equal protection analysis, concluding
that, although the areas have generally reached a rapprochement,
under the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, the government
retains less power to remedy race-based discrimination than to protect
freedoms of religious practice.
A. Religion and "The Law of Social Life"
The same year that the Supreme Court issued its first opinion
dealing with the Free Exercise Clause—upholding a conviction of po-
lygamy against a religion-based challenge by a Mormon defendant in
Reynolds u United States—Justice Field, riding circuit in California, de-
cided the case of Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan (1879). 166
 In striking down on
equal protection grounds a California statute that specified each pris-
oner must have "the hair of his head 'cut or clipped to an uniform
length of one inch from the scalp thereof,'" 167
 Field based his deter-
mination in part on free exercise concerns about the burden imposed
on the targeted class, Chinese men who believed that cutting of their
queue would lead to eternal perdition. 168
 One of the main differences
between the two cases' analyses is that Reynolds focused on individuals
and the specter of the man who would become a law unto himself,
whereas Ho Ah Kow articulated a theory of protected groups. 169
In Reynolds, the Court supported its decision that Congress was
authorized to pass a general law banning bigamy in the territories by
if`6
 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 153-68 (1878); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12
Cas. 252, 253-57 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879). Justice Field issued his opinion in Ho Ah Kow on
July 7, 1879, only niontlis after the Court's ruling in Reynolds. See Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at
252. As discussed in Part II.B supra, Justice Field's opinions on the subject of religious lib-
erty were influential in the context of his service on the California Supreme Court as well. •
See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text. It may not be incidental that justice Field's
father, David Dudley Field, Sr., had been a Congregationalist clergyman.in
 Connecticut
who had advocated equal treatment for other churches. See generally DAVID D. FIELD, CEN-
TENNIAL ADDRESS (1853). To make the chronological sequence of cases more transparent,
I will include the dates of cases in the text in Section 111.
167
 Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 253.
lag Id. at 253-54.
169 Compare id. at 253-57 (analyzing the effect of the statute with respect to the pro-
tected group), with Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167 (analyzing the effect of the statute with respect
to the individual).
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elaborating upon the lengthy history of such statutes in England and
America and by emphasizing that a culture of multiple marriages was
alien to the people of the United States.' 7° Further determining that
Reynolds—and others who shared his religious beliefs—should not be
exempted from the application of Congress's law, the Court invoked
both the specter of the man who would be a law unto himself and the
fear that polygamy would prove infectious and disease civil society as a
whole.'" Chief Justice White, writing for the Court, insisted that, de- •
spite the possibility of being temporarily self-contained within the
Mormon community, polygamy would inevitably escape into the rest
of society, a sphere over which government was entitled to legislate:
[P]olygamy ... fetters the people in stationary despotism,
while that principle cannot long exist in connection with mo-
nogamy.... An exceptional colony of polygamists under an
exceptional leadership may sometimes exist for a time without
appearing to disturb the social condition of the people who
surround it; but there cannot be a doubt that, unless re-
stricted by some form of constitution, it is within the legiti-
mate scope of the power of every civil government to deter-
mine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of
social life under its dominion. 172
According to the Chief Justice's assertion, allowing Mormons to dis-
regard general laws against bigamy would, in time, result not simply in
an exception to the law but in its overturning.'" Following similar
reasoning, he indicated that if Reynolds' claim were recognized, eve-
ryone might invoke religious beliefs to avoid general laws, a situation
that would lead to anarchy:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the ex-
clusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that
plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his
practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of re-
ligious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
I" Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161-66.
171 Id. at 166-67.
172
 Id. at 166.
1" Id. at 166-67.
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permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Govern-
ment could exist only in name under such circumstances. 174
In each reductio ad absurdum, the independent status of the group to
which Reynolds belonged was elided. On the one hand, the Court
viewed the situation from the vantage point of society as a whole and,
on the other, from that of the individual alone, in both cases moving
rapidly away from consideration of the targeted group.'"
By contrast, in Ho Ah Kow, Justice Field focused on the plaintiff's
membership in a group, the characteristics of which would make it par-
ticularly susceptible to the legislation in question.'" Proceeding, like
the Court in Reynolds, first by examining the capacity of the relevant
authority—here the county board of supervisors—to enact disciplinary
or health regulations for county prisoners, Field then turned to the pe-
titioner's equal protection challenge to the ordinance.'" Finding that
the requirement of cutting a prisoner's hair was not valid as a measure
of discipline, as a sanitary regulation, or, in the case of a misdemeanor,
as a means of identifying a prisoner in case of escape, Field held that
the ordinance exceeded the board of supervisors' authority.'"
174 Id.
175
 In reconfirming its unwillingness to permit a free exercise defense in the polygamy
context, the Court, in an opinion ironically authored by justice Field himself, went even
further in Davis v. Beason, emphasizing that an individual's free exercise may extend as far
as "exhibit[ing] his sentiments in such form of worship as Ile may think proper, not injuri-
ous of the equal rights of others," but that, "th]owever free the exercise of religion may be,
it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country ...." 133 U.S. 333, 342-43
(1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The Court in Davis associated
"the equal rights of others" with a particular justification for criminal laws—that of pre-
serving the rights of others against encroachment. See id. In the City of Boerne a Flores, Jus-
tice Scalia's concurrence insisted that historical protections for free exercise in the states
were limited precisely by the scope of all criminal laws. 521 U.S. 507, 539-40 (1997). As
discussed previously, phrases like "the equal rights of others" or "the public peace" cannot
be interpreted as isomorphic with all criminal laws in the context of the states' religious
jurisprudence. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text. It may be in Davis, however,
that the interpretation Justice Scalia advanced was first articulated. Compare Davis, 133 U.S.
at 342-43, with Flores, 521 U.S. at 539-40. The Court's language in Davis turns away from
the states' understanding of "the equal rights of others" towards a more limited version of
free exercise. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342-43.
176 See Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 253-57.
177 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161-66; Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 253-57. Others have noted
Field's reliance on free exercise considerations in his equal protection analysis. See Com-
ment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 812, 813 (1977) ("Although
the ordinance was invalidated on equal protection grounds, Justice Field recognized the
free exercise of religion dimension of the case ...." (footnote omitted)).
178
 Ho!Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 253-54.
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He also ruled in favor of Ho Ah Kow on an equal protection chal-
lenge to the law. 119 The terms of Field's discussion suggest that the
most important consideration was not racial, but instead religious
and, by extension, cultural bias. 18° The legislation in question ad-
versely affected Chinese prisoners' free exercise because of their be-
lief in the religious importance of the queue. 18 ' As Field wrote, ac-
cording to the complaint, "it is the custom of Chinamen to shave the.
hair from the front of the head and to wear the remainder of it
braided into a queue ... [and] the deprivation of the queue is re-
garded by them as a mark of disgrace, and is attended, according to
their religious faith, with misfortune and suffering after death .. . . "182
The law thus placed a special burden on the Chinese for religious rea-
sons; the analogies that Field provided likewise demonstrated the in-
terweaving of religious with racial and cultural discrimination. 185 He
claimed that "[miany illustrations might be given where ordinances,
general in their terms, would operate only upon a special class, or
upon a class, with exceptional severity, and thus incur the odium and
be subject to the legal objection of intended hostile legislation against
them." 1 84 Among these examples he included a hypothetical law that
would force Jewish prisoners to eat pork and referred to the manifold
laws that had, in fact, been enacted against Catholics in England. 185
The "special class" to which he referred thus appears to have been a
religious as well as a racial class, defined by certain cultural character-
istics targeted as a means of oppressing the group more generally. 186
The popular association of these "cultural" traits with a particular race
or religion becomes crucial in such cases; it is through the visibility of
characteristic activities that targeting can occur, and because of their
importance to the religion that they impose a burden upon the ra-
cial/religious class in question. Observation of these religious prac-
tices had led not to imitation, as the Court in Reynolds had feared,'"
but instead resulted in targeting. Religion thus both constituted a
179 Id. at 255-57.
180 See id at 253-57.
181 See id.
182 Id. at 253.
183 Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 255.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 255-56.
188 See id.
187 See Reynolds, 99 U.S. at 165-66.
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means by which to oppress racial groups and was conceived by Justice
Field himself as intimately connected with racial categories. 188
Describing the law as a result of hostility toward the Chinese, Jus-
tice Field determined from legislative history and enforcement effects
that the law was intended to target this group as well as in fact placing a
special burden upon it.'" As Field observed in relation to the legislative
history, "[t]he ordinance was intended only for the Chinese in San
Francisco. This was avowed by the supervisors on its passage, and was so
understood by every one."'" He also defended inferring intent from
disparate impact and discriminatory enforcement:
When we take our seats on the bench we are not struck with
blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as
men; and where an ordinance, though general in its terms,
only operates upon a special race, sect or class, it being uni-
'versally understood that it is to be enforced only against that
race, sect or class, we may justly conclude that it was the in-
tention of the body adopting it that it should only have such
operation, and treat it accordingly. 191
This approach toward general laws—looking beyond their facial char-
acteristics—contrasts with that of Reynolds and Davis. 192 Whereas the
free exercise cases upheld general criminal laws unquestioningly, Field
in the equal protection context insisted that the relationship between
the law and the groups it affected be analyzed.'" The approach that he
employed was not entirely focused on the burdens placed upon relig-
ious practice, but rather, like Vick Wo v. Hopkins, a case involving a San
Francisco ordinance targeted against Chinese launders, discerned a
discriminatory intent from, among other factors, the extraordinarily
disproportionate impact of the law.'" Although not entirely endorsing
188 See Ha Ah Kozo, 12 F. Cas. at 255-56 (Field, J.) (connecting religious groups with ra-
cial categories).
189 Id. at 255.
190 Id.
191 Id. This approach to inferring intent could be compared with that elaborated by
the Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 429 U.S.
252 (1977); see infra note 273 and accompanying text.
192 See Davis, 133 U.S. at 341-48; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161-67.
193 See Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 255
-56.
194 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,373-74 (1886) ('Though the law itself be fair
on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.").
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a substantive approach to equality, Ho Ah Kow thus tended further in
that direction than Reynold,s. 195
This method re-appeared in one of the twentieth-century opin-
ions most protective of free exercise, Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) . 196 Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Burger determined that the state's interest
in educating children past the eighth grade could not outweigh
Amish parents' free exercise claim against such forced schooling. In
reaching this conclusion, Justice Burger relied heavily on the status of
the Amish as a distinct community possessed of a long and illustrious
history.'" He first accepted plaintiffs' claim that children's attendance
at high school was fundamentally anathema to the Amish. Like Justice
Field in Ho Ah Kow, Justice Burger emphasized the importance of the
belief within Amish theology by connecting it with the group's as-
sumptions about the afterlife: Tilley believed that by sending their
children to high school, they would not only expose themselves to the
danger of the censure of the church community, but, as found by the
county court, also endanger their own salvation and that of their chil-
dren."198 Burger indicated—without fully demonstrating—that the
195 See generally Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. 252. Some might argue that Ho Ah Kow is consis-
tent with modern free exercise jurisprudence because it involves a sittiation where, as in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. a City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), a locality
specifically targeted a particular religious group for adverse treatment. Compare Ho Ah Kow,
12 F. Cas. at 253-54 (local law targeted Chinese immigrants), with Church of the Lultumi, 508
U.S. at 534-35 (local law targeted a religious group). At the sante time, however, both Yirk
Wo and Ho Ah Kow contain a more searching approach to looking beyond facially neutral
legislation and discerning discriminatory intent from disproportionate impacts than con-
temporary race and religion cases. See David Grump, Evidence, Rare, Intent, and Evil: The
Paradox of Purposelessness in the Constitutional Racial Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv.
285,298-99 (1998) (arguing that the intents and effects standard arising out of Washington
a Davis is inconsistent in certain respects with Yick Wo).
196 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Implicitly taking up the Court's concern in Reynolds with pro-
tecting the equal rights of individuals through upholding criminal laws, Professor Laura
Underkuffler-Freund has suggested that
Yoder . . . raises, in a very direct way, what I believe is one of the central ques-
tions presented by the Religion Clauses: the extent to which equality, as a
constitutional value, constrains our understanding of religious guarantees....
[T]he Yoder opinion deals with one aspect of this issue in particular ...
whether the granting of exemptions to religious individuals, from laws which
bind all other (nonreligious or "otherly religious") individuals, violates the
principle of equality of all citizens before the law.
See Laura S. Underktiffler-Freund, Yoder and the Question of Equality, 25 CAN. U. L. RE Y. 789,
789 (1996) (footnote omitted).
07 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209-13,234-36.
I" Id. at 209; see Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. Cas. at 253,255 (discussing the Chinese prisoners'
belief that deprivation of the queue will bring grave consequences in the afterlife).
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Amish objection to attending high school was not merely based on
secular judgments, then further supported this stance by appeal to
the communal nature of the belief, which he opposed to an individu-
alistic view of free exercise akin to that feared in Reynolds:
Although a determination of what is a 'religious' belief or
practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a
most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty
precludes allowing every person to make his own standards
on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has impor-
tant interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims be-
cause of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the con-
temporary secular values accepted by the majority ... their
claims would not rest on a religious basis. . .
Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however,
we see that the record in this case abundantly supports the
claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not
merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep re-
ligious conviction, shared by an organized group, and inti-
mately related to daily living.'"
Again following the example of Justice Field in Ho Ah Kow, Bur-
ger analogized the Amish way of life with the "Talmudic diet," both of
which constitute cultural practices corresponding to religious be-
liefs.2" Justice Burger also conceived the collectivity associated with
these traditions as a separate entity, distinct from the larger society. 201
Demonstrating concern not for Amish children's capacity to be inte-
grated within American society but instead for their ability to assimi-
late seamlessly into Amish society, Burger asserted that, "[l]n short,
high school attendance with teachers who are not of the Amish
faith—and may even be hostile to it—interposes a serious barrier to
the integration of the Amish child into the Amish religious commu-
nity."202 According to the same logic, one of the reasons for insisting
on the validity of the parents' free exercise claim is that in a fully
199 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (footnote omitted); see Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67 (ex-
pressing concern that allowing polygamy in the context of free exercise would allow each
individual to have his own set of laws).
200 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216; see Ho Ah Kow, 12 F. 01.9. at 253 (associating the Chinese cul-
tural practice of wearing one's hair braided into a queue with the religious belief that dep-
rivation of the queue would result in negative consequences in the afterlife).
291 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209-13.
292
 See id. 111.211-12.
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mixed society, the unitary quality of the Amish community would risk
being lost: "[a]s the record shows, compulsory school attendance to
age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very real threat of under-
mining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist to-
day; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at
large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant re-
gion."2°3 At this point, Burger seems to have come full circle: the
community in which the Amish belief was based, a collectivity that
persuaded Burger that the belief was genuinely religious, is precisely
what permitting free exercise in this sense sustains. 2°4
In his partial dissent, Justice Douglas demonstrated the results of
a different logic—one focused on the individual rather than class na-
ture of the free exercise claim.205 Douglas opined that the question of
whether the children—rather than the parents—intended to pursue a
free exercise claim should be considered. "Religion is an individual
experience. It is not necessary, nor even appropriate, for every Amish
child to express his views on the subject in a prosecution of a single
adult. Crucial, however, are the views of the child whose parent is the
subject of the suit."206 He further criticized Justice Burger's firm dis-
tinction between individual secular belief and religious opinion.207
The Yoder majority position leads in the Establishment Clause con-
text to judicial approval of governmental assistance to preformed relig-
ious collectivities, considered as part of a larger set of cultural groups,
as long as discrimination among these entities, or between religion and
non-religion, does not occur. 2" Justice Harlan's concurrence in Walz v.
Tax Commission of the City of New York (1970) and its inheritance in Jus-
tice Kennedy's concurrence and Justice Scalia's dissent in Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Grumet (1994) demonstrate the equal protection
reasoning behind this approach, one that sanitizes religion precisely by
making its expression into a cultural attribute. 209 This model of plural-
ism returns to the indistinction among race, religion, and culture that
was visible in Ho Ah Kow, but, rather than diagnosing decisions about
culture as surrogates for ones about race or religion, takes culture as an
203 Id. at 218.
204 See id. at 209-19.
299 See id. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
209 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
"7 Id. at 247-48.
2" See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
209 See infra notes 211-39 and accompanying text.
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acceptable substitute for suspect classifications. Like the emphasis on
groups in the free exercise area, the cultural method in the sphere of
establishment aids organized religious entities. At the same time, how-
ever, it disturbs the heightened protection of religious practices under
free exercise; once the Court displaces religion onto culture, the nature
of the right exercised and the status of the group protected is inelucta-
bly altered.210
In Walz, the Court upheld the New York City Tax Commission's
grant of property tax exemptions to religious organizations for proper-
ties used solely for religious worship determining that it violated nei-
ther the Establishment nor the Free Exercise Clause. 2" Justice Harlan's
concurrence claimed that two values underlie the religion clauses—
those of "neutrality" and "voluntarism.'"212 Elaborating upon the re-
quirement of neutrality, he asserted:
Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection
mode of analysis. The Court must survey meticulously the cir-
cumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it
were, religious gerrymanders. In any particular case the criti-
cal question is whether the circumference of legislation encir-
cles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that relig-
ious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural
perimeter.213
The analogy he constructed between Establishment Clause and voting
rights cases is illuminating. To ensure neutrality, according to
Harlan's account, one must examine upon whom the effects of legis-
lation fall; if the set of classes affected includes more than religious
ones, the law will pass the neutrality test. 214 Analyzing the relevant leg-
islation, Harlan concluded that, by encompassing not only a variety of
religious sects, but religion and non-religion alike not as different in
kind but rather in degree, it passed the neutrality test:
The statute by its terms grants this exemption in furtherance
of moral and intellectual diversity and would appear not to
21(1 The problems with conflating religion and culture in this context resemble those
that Richard Ford describes in the assimilation of race and culture. See supra notes 68-79
and accompanying text.
211 Walz, 397 U.S. at 680.
212
 Id. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
213
 Id. at 696.
214
 See id.
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omit any organization that could be reasonably thought to
contribute to that goal.
. . . As long as the breadth of exemption includes groups that
pursue cultural, moral, or spiritual improvement in multi-
farious secular ways, including, I would suppose, groups
whose avowed tenets may be antitheologicat, atheistic, or ag-
nostic, I can see no lack of neutrality in extending the
benefit of the exemption to organized religious groups.215
Eschewing a strict distinction between religion and non-religion, he
appealed instead to "moral and intellectual diversity," introducing the
language of culture as well. 216
The specter of a literal version of the "religious gerrymander" to
which Justice Harlan alluded appeared in the circumstances leading
up to Kiryas Joel, a case in which the Court held that an act designat-
ing the village of Kiryas Joel—a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim—
a separate school district violated the Establishment Clause. 217 The
facts of this case suggest it as the Establishment Clause mirror image
of Yoder.218
 Because of the Court's earlier decisions, the religious
schools in Kiryas Joel had not been permitted to receive public fund-
ing for handicapped students. 219
 These students had, therefore, been
sent to neighboring school districts. Their parents, however, eventu-
ally withdrew them from these schools, citing "'the panic, fear and
trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their own community and
being with people whose ways were so different.""22° The isolationist
impulse behind these actions are quite similar to those adduced by
the Amish in Yoder. 221
 Justice Stevens' concurrence in Kiryas foe I, like
Justice Douglas' partial dissent in Yoder, expressed dismay at the state's
acceptance of a community's segregation of its children:
215 Id. at 697.
216 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 696-97 (Harland,, concurring).
217 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 690.
218 Compare id at 690-94 (discussing Satmar Hasidim parents' desire to remove their
children from schools, believing attendance posed a real threat to their religious practice),
with Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-13 (discussing Amish parents' desire to remove their children
from schools, believing attendance posed a real threat to their religious practice).
219 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 692.
229 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rd. of Ed. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch.
Dist. v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767,770 (1988)):
221
 Compare Kiryas Joe4 512 U.S. at 691-92 (concerning Satmar •asidims' belief that
their children would suffer when removed from their community), with Yoder, 406 U.S. at
209-12 (concerning Amish belief that their children would suffer when removed from
their community).
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]The state action] affirmatively supports a religious sect's in-
terest in segregating itself and preventing its children from
associating with their neighbors. ... By creating a school dis-
trict that is specifically intended to shield children from con-
tact with others who have 'different ways,' the State provided
official support to cement the attachment of young adher-
ents to a particular faith. 222
In Yoder the Court granted the Amish community permission to iso-
late even its children, whereas in Kiryas Joel, the Court could not up-
hold state sponsorship of a school district constructed along religious
lines.223
The concurrence of Justice Kennedy—who has repeatedly cham-
pioned the equal protection approach to the religion clauses 224—ex-
plicitly analogized political line-drawing on the basis of religion with
that grounded in race and explained that the Court could not uphold
either.225 As he wrote:
Whether or not the purpose is accommodation and whether
or not the government provides similar gerrymanders to
people of all religious faiths, the Establishment Clause for-
bids the government to use religion as a line-drawing crite-
rion. In this respect, the Establishment Clause mirrors the
Equal Protection Clause. Just as the government may not
segregate people on account of their race, so too it may not
segregate on the basis of religion. The danger of stigma and
stirred animosities is no less acute for religious line-drawing
than for racial. 226
222 Kiryas Joel., 512 U.S. at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring); see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 244-46
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
223 Compare Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 690-94, with Yoder, 406 U.S. at 217-18,234.
224 See infra notes 306-08 and accompanying text.
223 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
226 Id. (citation omitted); see also Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Ju-
risdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. Rim 1365,1383 n.75 (1997). Corn-
menting on Kiryas Joel, Ford stated that:
[11 he parallel between the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause noted by Justice Kennedy is significant. According to this parallelism,
under the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses, the creation of a po-
litical subdivision that segregates citizens on the basis of either race or relig-
ion is constitutionally suspect. While equal protection doctrine has tradition-
ally not been concerned with mediating the tension between recognition and
creation, this tension is at the heart Of the relationship between the Estab-
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Despite denigrating such overt religious gerrymandering, Justice
Kennedy suggested a solution that would result in the same out-
come—that of permitting aid in handicapped instruction to the relig-
ious schools of the Kiryas Joel village. 227 He opined that School District
of Grand Rapids v. Ball (1985) 228 and Aguilar v. Felton (1985) 228 had
been decided erroneously and should he re-examined:
A neutral aid scheme, available to religious and nonreligious
alike, is the preferable way to address problems such as the
Satmar handicapped children have suffered. But for Grand
Rapids and Aguilar, the Satmars would have had no need to
seek special accommodations or their own school district.
Our decisions led them to choose that unfortunate course
2M
• • •
Thus Kennedy objected not to government support of separatism, but
simply to the extreme case in which government would become co-
extensive with a religious body.23'
lishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clauses governing religion. Using the
terminology of this article regarding the purposes of governmental actions,
we might say that the Establishment Clause ensures that government does not
create religious classifications, whereas the Free Exercise Clause requires that
government recognize religious groups (on the same basis as the government
recognizes any other group).
Ford, supra, at 1383 n.75 (citation omitted)
227 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 731 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
229 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
23° Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 731 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
231 See id. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the school voucher case decided in 2002,
Zelman n Simmons-Harris, similarly places great weight upon the manner in which aid is
dispensed to religious institutions. See 536 U.S. 639, 669 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Her opinion states that courts, in examining a challenged aid scheme, should
consider two factors: first, whether the program administers aid in a neutral
fashion, without differentiation based. on the religious status of beneficiaries or
providers of services; second, and more importantly, whether beneficiaries of
indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious organiza-
tions when determining the organization to which they will direct that aid.
Id. By invoking "genuine" private choice, Justice O'Connor seems to insist on the necessity
for individual, rather than institutional, decision-making about religion. See id. As Ira Lupu
and Robert Tuttle have pointed out, however, "neither the Court's opinion nor Justice
O'Connor's [in Zelman] provides adequate justification for the concept [of 'true private
choice']." Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman 's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and
the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 Noiac DAME L. REV. 917, 944 (2003). Justice
Souter's dissent likewise emphasizes the ephemeral nature of the private choice available.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 699-707 (Sttter, J., dissenting). Professor Gary Sittison adds that, "[wlith
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By adopting the cultural approach to religious difference, Justice
Scalia went even further in his dissent, refusing to object to the desig-
nation of Kiryas Joel as a separate school district. 252 Disputing Justice
Souter's claim that the delegation of civic authority had occurred ac-
cording to religious criteria, Scalia maintained that the case involved
"a group chosen according to cultural characteristics."233 He argued
against viewing cultural characteristics as a stand-in for race or relig-
ion and advocated instead considering them independent signs of
cultural groups, even when these overlapped with religious comrnuni-
ties. 234 As Scalia wrote, seeming to dismiss the idea that religion could
encompass cultural aspects rather than simply theological beliefs:
On what basis does Justice Souter conclude that it is the
theological distinctiveness rather than the cultural distinct-
iveness that was the basis for New York State's decision? The
normal assumption would be that it was the latter, since it
was not theology but dress, language, and cultural alienation
that posed the educational problem for the children.. ..
I have little doubt that Justice Souter would laud this hu-
manitarian legislation if all of the distinctiveness of the stu-
dents of Kiryas Joel were attributable to the fact that their
parents were nonreligious commune dwellers, or American
Indians, or gypsies. The creation of a special, one-culture
school district for the benefit of those children would pose
no problem. The neutrality demanded by the Religion
Clauses requires the same indulgence towards cultural char-
acteristics that are accompanied by religious belief.235
Scalia's conflation of race, religion, and culture is evident from other
examples that he provides. Native Americans, as Employment Division,
a little ingenuity, lawmakers can devise 'neutral program[s] of private choice' that, under
Zelman, constitutionally funnel substantial aid to religious institutions and organizations be-
sides parochial schools." Gary J. Simson, School Vouchers and the Comtitution—Permissible, Fm-
permissible, or Required?, 11 CORIVELLIL. & Pun. Por2v 553,575 (2002). In addition, precisely
because the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from intervening in the internal gov-
ernance of religious entities, the state may never diversify the denominations of available
religious schools. Voucher programs thus, through recognizing entrenched schools—pri-
marily of dominant religions—make de facto distinctions between religions as well as be-
tween religion and non-religion. In such circumstances, private choice remains simply rhe-
torical rather than genuine.
259 See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 732-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 734.
24 See id. at 740-41.
235
 See'id.
2006]	 The Equal Proieciion of Free Exercise 	 325
Department of Human Resources of Oregon at Smith (1990) 236 demon-
strated, engage in certain specific religious practices, while gypsies
have been subject to a history of racial and not simply cultural dis-
crirnination. 237 Merely considering the fact that most religions involve
some tangible cultural practices reveals that this approach would
significantly limit the Court's awareness of when oppressive legislation
targeted particular religious groups—rather than simply cultures, or,
in Reynolds' terms, "social life."238 Indeed, Scalia's distinction could
limit the purview of free exercise examination to cases in which be-
liefs were the object of oppression or when a practice shared by more
than one community was banned only with respect to a particular re-
ligious group.239
B. Facially Discriminatory or Facially Classificatory?
Since 1944, review of government action categorizing on the basis
of race has required strict scrutiny. 240 Some such classifications, how-
ever, have been upheld for affirmative action purposes, which is con-
sidered a compelling state interest, as long as the means employed is
narrowly tailored to the end to be served. Although the Court has not
insisted that the least restrictive means be used, it has required findings
supporting the need for remediation. 241
 In the religion context, by con-
trast, the Court has generally adhered to a broader distinction between
discrimination and classification, applying strict scrutiny uniformly in
cases of discrimination but not always in those of classification. 242 In-
deed, the existence of the Free Exercise Clause—which provides the
238 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2'1 See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2" See id.; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
2" See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 740-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). These were the circum-
stances underlying the case involving the Church of the Lukumi. See infra notes 304-07
and accompanying text.
216 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
241 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-92 (1989); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
vs Compare McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to strike
down a Tennessee provision disqualifying clergy from being legislators or constitutional
convention delegates), with Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005) (holding that the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, which elevated the standard
of review for free exercise claims arising in federal prisons, did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause). As the Court in Cutter stated, "No government shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, un-
less the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest, and does so by the least re-
strictive means."
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closest analogue to remedial purpose in the religion context—has in
the past been conceived as mandating certain exceptions constructed
on a religious basis. 243
 Even beyond the requirements of free exercise,
accommodation has sometimes been upheld in cases where it does not
result in an Establishment Clause violation. 244
 The choice of whether to
approach equal protection or free exercise claims as matters of
classification or of discrimination may accord with disparate views
about the conception of equality contemplated—whether emphasizing
anti-classification or anti-subordination as the normative goal—as well
as the relative significance of individually and group-based harms. 245
In Karematsu v. United States (1944), justice Black, writing for the
Court, determined that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to
say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."246
 In the context of free
exercise, restrictions explicitly directed against religious belief and
conduct have been struck down and the Court has implemented a
heightened form of scrutiny. 247
 Although the protection for religious
belief has been almost absolute, the plurality's opinion in McDaniel v.
Paty (1978), analyzing the "status" of minister or priest as a function of
conduct rather than belief, suggested that such explicit restrictions on
religious practices should be subject to strict scrutiny. 248
 Facially privi-
leging or discriminatory legislation has likewise been reviewed using a
heightened standard under the Establishment Clause. 249
One approach to evaluating apparent benefits to religion under
the Establishment Clause would be to determine whether the Free
Exercise Clause requires an exemption for a particular religious
group or for religion as such; in this case, governmental action creat-
243 See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (holding that Amish students could not be compelled to at-
tend public schools).
244
 See Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2117.
243
 See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Con-
stitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-76 (2004).
246 323 U.S. at 216.
247 See, e.g.', McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 618 (using strict scrutiny to strike clown a Tennessee
provision disqualifying clergy from being legislators or constitutional convention dele-
gates); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (invalidating a Maryland requirement that
holders of public office declare their belief in the existence of God).
243
 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626-29.
249
 See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 696 (stating that "the statute creating the Kiryas Joel Vil-
lage School District[] departs from [the] constitutional command [of neutrality] by dele-
gating the States discretionary authority over public schools to a group defined by its char-
acter as a religious community").
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ing an exception would not constitute a violation of the Establishment
Clause. Although permitting space for the free exercise of religion
represents the goal of this analysis, the Court has not in all instances
insisted on its own determination of what free exercise requires or
permits. The Court has, indeed, allowed both state and federal gov-
ernments a greater latitude in accommodating free exercise than it
has permitted in remedying racial discrimination. After Katzenbach v.
Morgan (196,6), it appeared as though the Court would give consider-
able deference to at least Congress's assertions of a remedial purpose
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if not to those
of states and localities. 25° Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority in
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), however, undermined that assumption
and suggested instead that Congress must, like states and localities,
adhere to the Court's determination of whether remediation is re-
quired and provide detailed findings in the absence of prior adjudica-
tion by the Court. 2" Thus, while the Court has deemed remediation a
compelling state interest in the context of race, 252 the government's
burden of production in support of affirmative action programs is
quite high.255 On the other hand, the government—even after
Smith—retains substantial latitude in permitting exemptions from
generally applicable laws for religious purposes.254
The fact that the Court's decision in a free exercise case will—
like the determination in the race context that remediation is re-
quired—authorize and occasion government action to protect the
free exercise rights that have been violated has, in several instances,
led to the importation of an equal protection analysis into the initial
free exercise determination. Although this equal protection reason-
ing bears many similarities to thinking under the Establishment
Clause, the two are not quite the same. The opinion that most clearly
250 See 384 U.S. 641, 648 (1966) (granting an expansive scope to exercise of congres-
sional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment reads: "Lae Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article." U.S. CoNs .r. amend. XIV, § 5.
251 See 521 U.S. at 530; see also City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 490-92.
252 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496 (referring to "a remedy that serves the compelling gov-
ernmental interest in eradicating the continuing effects of past discrimination identified
by Congress").
253 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
254 Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith concludes by endorsing the idea of "leav-
ing accommodation to the [statel political process," stating that an exemption for peyote
use would be permissible and even desirable but not constitutionally mandated. 494 U.S.
872, 890 (1990); see also Cutter, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (asserting the same proposition at the fed-
eral level).
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introduced this type of equal protection analysis into the free exercise
context was Justice Stevens' concurrence in Goldman v. Weinberger. 255
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, denying petitioner Ortho-
dox Jew's free exercise challenge to the application of the Air Force's
regulation against indoor headgear to his own act of wearing a yar-
mulke, had emphasized the need for deference to authority within
the military.256
 Speaking of the free exercise challenge as advancing
an "individual autonomy" interest, and asserting that "[t]he consid-
ered professional judgment of the Air Force is that the traditional
outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the sub-
ordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the over-
all group mission," the Court applied a reasonableness standard to
the Air Force's regulation. 257
By contrast, in his concurrence, Stevens emphasized group
affiliation rather than individual compliance, stating that "[t]he interest
in uniformity ... has a dimension that is of still greater importance for
me. It is the interest in uniform treatment for the members of all relig-
ious faiths."258 Accepting Justice Brennan's dissent, which suggested
that "turbans, saffron robes, and dreadlocks" might be excluded
through "dress and grooming rules that have a reasoned basis in, for ex-
ample, functional utility, health and safety considerations, and the goal
of a polished, professional appearance," 259 as the path that would be
followed if Goldman were permitted to wear his yarmulke, Stevens
deemed this solution too discriminatory against other religions. 260 As
he concluded:
255 475 U.S. 503, 510-13 (1986) (Stevens, j., concurring). Both Justices White and
Powell joined Stevens' concurrence. Id. at 510 (Stevens, J., concurring), Justice Blackmun,
dissenting, also agreed with Stevens' equal protection rationale. Id. at 524-28 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 507-10 (majority opinion).
257 Id. at 507, 508, 510.
256 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 512 (Stevens, J., concurring).
259 Id. at 519 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that the considerations
Brennan enumerated to construct a "reasoned" basis for restrictions are quite similar to
those adduced by the city in Ho Ah Kow—justifications that Justice Field dismissed as pre-
textual. Compare id (listing functional utility, health and safety considerations, and the goal
of a polished, professional appearance a reasoned basis for appearance restrictions), with
Ho Ah Kozo, 12 F. Cas. at 253-54 (listing sanitary and disciplinary considerations as rea-
soned basis for appearance restrictions). This comparison suggests that garb or coiffure to
which the majority is not accustomed may, more often than not, be considered unsanitary
or unprofessional, thus confirming Justice Stevens' concern that exemptions will them-
selves be granted in a discriminatory fashion.
460 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 512-13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The very strength of Captain Goldman's claim creates the
danger that a similar claim on behalf of a Sikh or a Rasta-
farian might readily be dismissed as "so extreme, so unusual,
or so faddish an image that public confidence in his ability
to perform his duties will be destroyed." If exceptions from
dress code regulations are to be granted on the basis of a
multifactored test such as that proposed by Justice Brennan,
inevitably the decisionmaker's evaluation of the character
and the sincerity of the requester's faith—as well as the
probable reaction of the majority to the favored treatment of
a member of that faith—will play a critical part in the deci-
sion. For the difference between a turban or a dreadlock on
the one hand, and a yarmulke on the other, is not merely a
difference in "appearance"—it is also the difference between
a Sikh or a Rastafarian, on the one hand, and an Orthodox
Jew on the other. The Air Force has no business drawing dis-
tinctions between such persons when it is enforcing com-
mands of universal application. 261
Agreeing with Justice Stevens' argument, Justice Blackmun, in dissent,
explicitly stated its connection with establishment and equal protec-
tion principles, explaining that the problem consists not simply in
permitting the Air Force to determine what religious garb is accept-
able or not, but in allowing the perceptions of the majority to dictate
this determination. 262
 In rejecting the "reasonable observer" standard,
he stated:
To allow noncombat personnel to wear yarmulkes but not
turbans or dreadlocks because the latter seem more obtru-
sive ... would be to discriminate in favor of this country's
more established, mainstream religions, the practices of
which are more familiar to the average observer. . . .
[F]avoritism based on how unobtrusive a practice appears to
the majority could create serious problems of equal protec-
tion and religious establishment, problems the Air Force
clearly has a strong interest in avoiding by drawing an objec-
tive line at visibility. 266
261 Id. (citation omitted).
262 Id. at 526-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263 Id.
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Blackmun thus incorporated into the interest the government could
claim for free exercise purposes an equal protection and establishment
element. 264 Free exercise analysis therefore does not provide a deter-
mination of what burdens are excessive that remains completely prior
to, and independent of, an Establishment Clause approach, but instead
may already include the latter as a more or less explicit element by
running through a related set of equal protection hypotheticals.
This preventative equ'al protection approach has not been re-
stricted to the free exercise context but has similarly entered into
cases such as Kiryas Joel (1994). 20 Justice Souter, writing for the major-
ity, claimed that "[t] he fact that this school district was created by a
special and unusual Act of the legislature . . . gives reason for concern
whether the benefit received by the Satmar community is one that the
legislature will provide equally to other religious (and nonreligious)
groups."266 Justice Scalia's dissent singled out this aspect of the deci-
sion for particular contumely, as he argued—in complete disregard of
the logic expressed by the concurrence in Goldman and voiced in
other cases—that importing an equal protection element into the
analysis before other groups had attempted to obtain the same
benefits constituted an irrational innovation:
The second and last reason the Court finds accommodation
impermissible is, astoundingly, the mere risk that the State
will not offer accommodation to a similar group in the fu-
ture, and that neutrality will therefore not be preserved.. ..
The Court's demand for 'up front' assurances of a neutral
system is at war with both traditional accommodation doc-
trine and the judicial role. . . .
What I attack is the Court's imposition of novel "up front"
procedural requirements on state legislatures. Making law
(and making exceptions) one case at a time, whether through
adjudication or through highly particularized rulemaking or
legislation, violates, ex ante, no principle of fairness, equal pro-
tection, or neutrality simply because it does not announce in
261 See id.
265 512 U.S. at 687.
266 Id. at 702.
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advance how all future cases' (and all future exceptions) will
be disposed 4. 267
Souter responded to Scalia's criticism by insisting:
nder the dissent's theory, if New York were to pass a law
providing school buses only for children attending Christian
day schools, we would be constrained to uphold the statute
against Establishment Clause attack until faced by a request
from a non-Christian family for equal treatment under the
patently unequal law. 268
This case demonstrates that the equal protection analysis of the treat-
ment of similarly situated groups in the free exercise context cannot be
completely assimilated to an Establishment Clause examination, but
instead can be incorporated into Establishment Clause cases, as a re-
lated, but distinct inquiry.
C. Intent and Effects
Requiring that those who claim to have suffered from discrimina-
tion or from infringement of their religious liberties demonstrate, in
the absence of facially discriminatory legislation, impermissible in-
tent, rather than simply causing a disproportionate impact, leads to a
more formal than substantive notion of equality. 269
 This Section dem-
onstrates that, on the federal level, both equal protection analysis and
religion clause jurisprudence have, in recent years, moved towards
this formal conception of equality through endorsing an intent and
effects standard.
According to Justice White's opinion for the Court in Washington v.
Davis (1976), in which African-American respondents failed a qualify-
ing test measuring verbal abilities administered to applicants for posi-
tions as police officers and claimed a constitutional violation based on
discriminatory effects, disparate impact alone cannot invalidate a law or
other official act under equal protection analysis, although it may serve
as evidence of a discriminatory purpose. 279 In Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977), Justice Powell articu-
lated a set of factors that could assist in determining whether such a
262 Id. at 745-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Goldman, 475 U.S. at 512-13 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
268
	Joel, 512 U.S. at 709.
269 See Piss, supra note 32, at 141-56.
270 426 U.S. 229,238-48 (1976).
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purpose existed and a burden-shifting approach. 27' Under the burden-
shifting scheme, the discovery of a discriminatory motive among other
motives places the burden back upon the legislative body to demon-
strate the ascendancy of the nondiscriminatory motive, but once such a
showing has occurred, the Court returns to a rationality review. 272 The
factors investigated to determine purpose include: "[t]he historical
background of the decision . . . particularly if it reveals a series of
official actions taken for invidious purposes.. .. [t] he specific sequence
of events leading up [to] the challenged decision.. .. [d]epartures
from the normal procedural sequence.... [s]ubstantive depar-
tures. . . . [and] legislative or administrative history."273
Any comparison between these tests in the area of race and those
applied in the context of the religion clauses must consider at least two
periods of modern religion clause jurisprudence, the first governed by
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 274 and Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 275 in the estab-
lishment and free exercise contexts, respectively, and the second sig-
naled by the gradual adjustment of the Lemon standard, as well as the
plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms (2000) 276
 and the holdings in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002),2" Smith (1990),278 and Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. u City of Hialeah (1993).279 During the course of
the alteration from the first set of standards to the second, the Court
has gradually reconceived the role of purpose and effect in the religion
clauses and increasingly conformed its tests to those employed under
equal protection.
271
 429 U.S. at 265-68, 270-71 n.21..
272 Id. at 270-71 n.21 ("Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a
racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the
challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of
establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible pur-
pose not been considered. If this were established, the complaining party in a case of this
kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper consideration
of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, there would be no justification for
judicial interference with the challenged decision.").
275 Id. at 267-68 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Though, Justices Scalia and
Thomas take exception to use of legislative history by the courts. For a discussion of Jus-
tices Scalia's and Thomas' resistance to legislative history, see Thomas W. Merrill, Textual-
ism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 351, 365 (1994).
274
 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
275
 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
276 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
277 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
218 494 U.S. at 872.
279 508 U.S. at 520.
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In Lemon, Chief justice Burger, writing for the Court, struck down
certain types of financial aid to nonpublic schools, and held that legis-
lation must meet three criteria to avoid running afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause: If irst, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that nei-
ther advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "28° Although
one prong dealt with purpose and another with effect, the third part .
of the Lemon test—that prohibiting "excessive entanglement"—did
not possess an equal protection paralle1, 281 Furthermore, whereas a
claimant in the equal protection context was required to demonstrate
both legislative purpose and effect, until recently each criterion set
out in Lemon could be used independently to invalidate a statute. 282
The requirement of a secular legislative purpose was long criti-
cized since it appeared to conflict with the permissibility of accommo-
dation under and beyond the Free Exercise Clause. 288 In a certain way,
however, the analysis of secular purpose resembles the discussion of
remedial purpose that is comparable to the examination of whether a
purported violation of the Establishment Clause represented, in reality,
a legitimate attempt to protect free exercise. Indeed, in some respects
secular purpose remains an alternative path of evaluation under the
Establishment Clause—one employed in the absence of facially privi-
leging legislation. The secular purpose and accommodation of free ex-
ercise analyses would thus sit side by side as components of, on the one
hand, an intent and effects inquiry, and, on the other, an examination
of facially classifying government action. The question of how much
deference should be accorded the government in its articulation of a
secular purpose has also been contested.
In Edwards v. Aguillard (1987), Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, invalidated a Louisiana requirement that evolution and creation
science be taught side by side, if at all, referring to the lack of a credible
secular purpose: "[w]hile the Court is normally deferential to a State's
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of
23° Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
"I See id.
282 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997) (describing the separate treat-
ment of entanglement and primary effect in previous cases). For a discussion of the factors
in the Lemon test, see Caryl Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethink-
ing the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL. L. REV. 905 (1987).
2" For a discussion of the objections raised against the secular purpose requirement,
see Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REv. 87, 98-102 (2002) (enumerating
four critiques).
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such purpose be sincere and not a sham.. .. [W]e need not be blind in
this case to the legislature's preeminent religious purpose in enacting
this statute." 284 The Court—and, in particular, Chief Justice Burger—
has been much more deferential to the government's articulation of
purpose, however, when examining legislation or governmental prac-
tices that, admittedly, originally derived from religious beliefs, but have
persisted so long that their initial signification appears to have eroded,
like a dead metaphor.285
 It is worth noting that this invocation of a
longstanding tradition would presumably be ineffectual in the context
of race, as the Fourteenth Amendment stands precisely for the attempt
to undo a heritage of discrimination.
The structure of the secular purpose test bears even stronger re-
semblances to the method of evaluating nondiscriminatory motives set
forth in Arlington Heights.286 Application of the test in Lemon has sug-
gested that the Court employs a similar type of burden-shifting ap-
proach when examining whether the government can convincingly ad-
duce a secular purpose for its action. 287 Justice Scalia's dissent in Kiryas
Joel specifically applied the burden–shifting method derived from Ar-
lington Heights to the Establishment Clause context:
To establish the unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law
on the mere basis of its asserted religiously preferential (or
discriminatory) effects—or at least to establish it in confor-
mity with our precedents—Justice Souter "must be able to
show the absence of a neutral, secular basis" for the law. . . .
There is of course no possible doubt of a secular basis
here....
Since the obvious presence of a neutral, secular basis ren-
ders the asserted preferential effect of this law inadequate to
284 482 U.S. 578, 586-87, 590 (1987).
285 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (refusing to find a creche in the
midst of a Christmas display with other traditional decorations to be an Establishment
Clause violation); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer in
Nebraska in light of an unbroken history of two hundred years); Watt, 397 U.S. at 678 (cit-
ing "an unbroken practice of according [a tax] exemption to churches" in holding consti-
tutional a New York statute exempting front real property tax property owned by exclu-
sively religious associations that used the property exclusively for carrying out religious
purposes). All of these opinions were written by Chief Justice Burger and shared a similar
logic.
286 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-68.
"7 See•.Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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invalidate it, Justice Souter is required to come forward with
direct evidence that religious preference was the objective. 288
Thus the secular purpose analysis in the religion context parallels the
inquiry into legislative purpose in the area of race.
The third prong of the Lemon test—"excessive entanglement"289—
has also been subjected to substantial criticism, and the question of
what effects are permissible has similarly been debated. Led by Justice
Thomas, the plurality in Mitchell suggested that Agostini v. Felton (1997)
had modified the Lemon test by examining primarily the first two factors
when evaluating aid to schools and demoting this controversial third
element to the status of a factor in determining effect. 29° According to
Justice Souter's dissent, even in considering purpose and effect, the
plurality eliminated the second consideration. As he stated, "[w]hat is
more important is the view revealed in the plurality opinion, which es-
pouses a new conception of neutrality as a practically sufficient test of
constitutionality that would, if adopted by the Court, eliminate enquiry
into a law's effects."291 This critique finds substantial support in the lan-
guage ofJustice Thomas' decision.
Thomas first rehearsed the criteria listed in Agostini to determine
whether government aid had the effect of enhancing religion—the re-
quirements that "'Mt does not result in governmental indoctrination;
define its recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive en-
tanglement"'—but quickly dismissed the excessive entanglement in-
quiry even in this subsidiary context as irrelevant to the case at hand. 292
It is worth noting that defining recipients by relation to religion also
seems to fit into the types of facially classificatory governmental actions
discussed in Part HI, Section B. Thus whether governmental indoctri-
nation resulted would constitute the only remaining truly effects-
oriented inquiry. Justice Thomas, however, reduced even this aspect to
that of defining recipients by reference to religion, further collapsing
that prong into the purpose prong. 293
 As he maintained:
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable
to the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consis-
tently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that
2813 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 737-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
289 Leman, 403 U.S. at 613.
29° Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807-08; see Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223-24.
291 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 869 (Souter, J., dissenting).
292 Id. at 808 (plurality opinion) (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234).
293 Id. at 809-10.
336	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 47:275
is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without re-
gard to their religion.... For attribution of indoctrination is a
relative question. If the government is offering assistance to
recipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoc-
trination, the government itself is not thought responsible for
any particular indoctrination. To put the point differently, if
the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular
purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to relig-
ion, to all who adequately further that purpose then it is fair
to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the
effect of furthering that secular purpose. 294
Although still nominally pursuing an intent and effects inquiry, Tho-
mas succeeded in placing disproportionate and determinative weight
on the secular purpose prong. 295 Thus the Establishment Clause doc-
trine largely conforms with equal protection analysis, but with the
emphasis slightly shifted away from effects and onto purpose 2 96
In Sherbert, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained that
disqualifying from employment benefits a woman who had lost her
job because she observed Saturday as her Sabbath imposed a substan-
tial burden upon the woman's free exercise rights by forcing her to
choose between material sustenance and religious convictions. 297 Such
a burden, the Court held, must be justified by a compelling and secu-
lar state interest. The Court further reasoned that the objective the
state had articulated, that of preventing fraud, was not compelling,
and, even if' it were, the state would have had to demonstrate that, it
possessed no available alternative means of protecting its interest. 298
This test, although recalling earlier equal protection cases like Yick Wo
v. Hopkins (1886), which, in invalidating a permitting ordinance ad-
ministered in an extremely discriminatory fashion, relied on the ef-
fects of the challenged law in arriving at its outcome, did not conform
M Id. (citation omitted).
295
 See id.
296 Justice •elinquist's majority opinion in Zelman adds the criterion of "private choice"
to the inquiries emphasized by the Mitchell plurality. See Zetman, 536 U.S. at 652. Including
this further criterion represented a concession to Justice O'Connor. See Lupu & Tuttle,
supra note 231, at 928 ("Although criteria concerning program neutrality were enough to
satisfy four of the Justices in the majority, these standards do not in and of themselves
make the aid indirect, so the Court's final inquiry turns out to be the dispositive one in
maintaining a majority."). The individual autonomy that the phrase "private choice" sug-
gests turns out, however, to be illusory. See id. at 944.
297 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399, 403-04.
298 See id. at 406-07.
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to the purpose and effects standard for equal protection claims that
would subsequently be articulated in Washington v. Davis.' 99 Again the
doctrinal innovation arose first in the equal protection context before
being introduced in the religion clause arena.
Following a period during which free exercise cases invoked strict
scrutiny but did not apply it, the Sherbert test was finally dispensed with
by Smith, which, insisting like Mitchell on a neutrality standard, held
that neutral laws of general applicability did not have to be justified by
a compelling interest even if they placed a burden upon free exer-
cise.500
 Although Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority initially dis-
missed Justice O'Connor's continued adherence to the compelling
interest test as simply an ungrounded importation from the equal
protection context, 301
 he quickly elaborated the way in which his ap-
proach complied with the intent and effects inquiry under Washington
v. Davis. As Scalia wrote:
[C]omparison with other fields supports, rather than un-
dermines, the conclusion we draw today. Just as we subject to
the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifications
based on race ... so too we strictly scrutinize governmental
classifications based on religion. But we have held that race-
neutral laws that have the effect of disproportionately disad-
vantaging a particular racial group do not thereby become
subject to compelling-interest analysis under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.... Our conclusion that generally applicable,
religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a par-
ticular religious practice need not be justified by a compel-
229 Compare id., with Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368-74, and Washington, 426 U.S. at 238-45. See
also supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-89. Compare id. (holding the Sherbert test inapplicable to free
exercise claims) , with Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10 (insisting on a neutrality standard). Al-
though Smith did not overrule Sherbert, it severely limited its scope. See Smith, 494 U.S. at
883-84.
301 As he stated:
The 'compelling government interest" requirement seems benign, because it
is familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met be-
fore the government may accord different treatment on the basis of race or
before the government may regulate the content of speech is not remotely
comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in
those other fields—equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contend-
ing speech—are constitutional normS; what it would produce here—a private
right to ignore generally applicable laws—is a constitutional anomaly.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-86 (citations omitted).
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ling governmental interest is the only approach compatible
with these precedents. 3°2
Notably, in Smith, Justice Scalia refrained from further articulating an
intent and effects test for free exercise—partly perhaps because of his
reluctance to delve into the quagmire of legislative history. 303
The Court's decision in Church of the Lukumi, a case invalidating a
city ordinance proscribing animal sacrifice, a practice of the Santeria
religion, however, confirmed that an intent and effects analysis would
be applied.304 Justice Kennedy's opinion employed an equal protec-
tion approach throughout. 505 Initially asserting that the statute was
facially neutral, he determined through the text of the law and ac-
companying city council resolutions about "certain [unnamed] relig-
ions" as well as inferences from its effects that the purpose of the or-
dinance was to single out religious practice for discriminatory
treannent.306 Because the law prohibited a practice central to the San-
teria religion, its effect was clearly to place a burden upon church
members' free exercise. 307 Kennedy explicitly articulated the relation-
ship between his method and an equal protection approach only
when no longer writing for the majority:
In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under
the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our
equal protection cases. As Justice Harlan noted in the related
context of the Establishment Clause, "Neutrality in its appli-
cation requires an equal protection mode of analysis." Here,
as in equal protection cases, we may determine the city coun-
cil's object from both direct and circumstantial evidence.
Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical
background of the decision under challenge, the specific se-
ries of events leading to the enactment or official policy in
question, and the legislative or administrative history, includ-
ing contemporaneous statements made by members of the
decisionmaking body. These objective factors bear on the
question of discriminatory object. 308
3(12 Id. at 886 n.3 (citations omitted).
303 See M errill,  supra note 273, at 365.
304 See infra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
305 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 523-47.
306 Id. at 534-38.
307 See al. at 535-36.
368 Id. at 540 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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Again, although the approach to free exercise analysis has become
analogous to that under equal protection, the Court seems, as in the
Establishment Clause context, to place more weight on purpose than
effects.
D. Neutrality and Color-Blindness
The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise jurisprudence of the
Court appears to be converging on a standard of neutrality—one that
accepts "neutral laws of general applicability" regardless of whether
they incidentally burden free exercise and advocates only the "princi-
ple of neutrality" in allocating benefits to religious groups. s°9 The ma-
jority's assumption in Smith that neutral, generally applicable laws will
not violate the Constitution even if they impede free exercise and the
plurality's endorsement of the principle of neutrality in Mitchell were
both criticized by dissenters as reducing the religion clauses to a ver-
sion of equal protection.31° The problem, however, does not stem
from the gradual rapprochement of the doctrines but instead from
the prior evisceration of the Equal Protection Clause's force. The dis-
senters' critiques do, however, serve to illuminate the nature of this
emerging standard of "neutrality"—a term that, as Justice Souter
demonstrated, has regularly been imbued with new significance."'
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clause versions of the "neu-
trality" doctrine, as currently invoked, possess a dual inheritance—one
stemming from Reynolds' discussion of generally applicable laws and the
other from Justice Harlan's concurrence in Walz applying neutrality as a
version of equal protection. 312
 As illustrated above, Reynolds itself focused
not on groups, but instead on the requirement that individuals conform
their actions to generally applicable laws. 313
 Justice Scalia's opinion in
Smith echoed the language of Reynolds not only in referring to "neutral
law[s] of general applicability" but also in explaining, like Justice White,
that permitting a religious objector to violate "generally applicable pro-
hibitions of socially harmful conduct" would allow the individual believer
3°9
 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793; Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
310 See supra note 36 and accompanying text,
"I justice Souter has, in several opinions, provided a lengthy discussion of the history
of "neutrality," and given an overview of three phases of its definition. See Mitchell, 530 U.S.
at 878-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
312
 See Walt, 397 U.S. at 696-97 (Harlan, J., concurring); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
3" See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67,
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to "become a law unto himself." 314
 Although Scalia subsequently argued
that neutrality and general applicability may be inextricably intertwined,
he did articulate a specific signification for each phrase, associating neu-
trality with a facial review and general applicability with an inquiry into
his equivalent of intent and effects. Thus, for Scalia:
[T]he defect of lack of neutrality applies primarily to those
laws that &y their terms impose disabilities on the basis of relig-
ion ... whereas the defect of lack of general applicability ap-
plies primarily to those laws which, though neutral in their
terms, through their design, construction, or enforcement
target the practices of a particular religion for discriminatory
treatment.313
The second Justice Harlan had likewise appealed to "neutrality" in
Walz, stating that "[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal pro-
tection mode of analysis," and explaining that this inquiry entailed
evaluating whether legislation swept broadly enough that particular
classes did not appear to be targeted. 316
 His version of neutrality con-
forms more with what Scalia calls "general applicability" than with a
911 Compare Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, 885 ("To make an individual's obligation to obey such
a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the
interest is 'compelling'–permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto
himself,'—contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense." (citation omitted)),
with Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67 ("To permit [individuals exempting themselves from U.S.
laws due to religion] would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.").
915 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (citations omitted).
916 Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harland., concurring).
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facial neutrality." As Justice Souter described this standard, it entails
"[e]venhandedness of distribution." 318
The type of neutrality that the second Justice Harlan advocated
in Walz suggested a new standard akin to the colorblind approach that
had been propounded by the first Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson
and would be advocated by Justice Powell in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke (1978)." Other aspects of Harlan's opinion in Walz
5 J 7
 Compare id. ("In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference
of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institu-
tions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter."), with Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 557
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he defect of lack of
neutrality applies primarily to those laws that by their terms impose disabilities on the basis of
religion ...."). It is worth remembering that the second Justice Harlan's view of the Equal
Protection clause was less than expansive. See Stephen M. Dane, "Ordered Liberty" and Self-
Restraint: The Judicial Philosophy of the Second Justice Harlan, 51 U. ON. L. REv. 545, 559 (1982)
('The Supreme Court during the Warren era breathed new life into the equal protection
clause. It began to apply a strict standard of review to state actions that discriminated against
what the Court called 'suspect' groups or that infringed upon the exercise of `fundamental'
rights. Harlan found this process to be 'unwise' and 'troublesome.' In any situation other
than one involving race, he believed, the proper standard to be applied was the traditional
one of rationality of classification.").
318 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 877 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to Justice Souter, Justice
O'Connor, who had only concurred in Mitchell, but joined the majority in Zelman, "appar-
ently no longer distinguishes between this notion of evenhandedness neutrality and the
free-exercise neutrality in Everson." Zelman, 536 U.S. at 696 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting).
319
 Compare Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harland., concurring) (suggesting that any legisla-
tion must be written so broadly that any religious institution would naturally fall within its
boundaries), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(affirming the purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments as removing race-based dis-
crimination), and Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)
(stating that preferential treatment on the sole basis of race was unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory). The partial concurrence in Bakke penned by Justice Brennan points to the
nature of the dispute about the advisability of resuscitating the standard invoked by the
first Justice Harlan but never, in fact, applied:
Against this background, claims that law must be "color-blind" or that the da-
tum of race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration
rather than as description of reality. This is not to denigrate aspiration; for
reality rebukes us that race has too often been used by those who would stig-
matize and oppress minorities. Yet we cannot—and, as we shall demonstrate,
need not under our Constitution or Title VI, which merely extends the con-
straints of the Fourteenth Amendment to private parties who receive federal
funds—let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many
"created equal" have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the
law and by their fellow citizens.
Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, K.G. Jan Pillai notes both that neutrality is an
aspect of the theory of colorblindness and that the meaning of neutrality in the equal pro-
tection context has been far from clear. As Pillai writes:
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similarly foreshadowed Bakke—providing one instance in which a re-
ligion clause alteration may have supplied the impetus for an equal
protection one. In Walz, Harlan emphasized that legislation covering
a broad range of cultural as well as religious categories should be con-
sidered neutral since it did not single out religious groups to accom-
plish its purposes.320 Justice Powell's insistence in Bakke that the inter-
est in obtaining diversity in higher education is compelling revealed a
similar logic. As he explained:
[T] he nature of the state interest that would justify consid-
eration of race or ethnic background.... is not an interest
in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of
the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of
selected ethnic groups.... The diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single though important element."'
This emphasis on encompassing a broad range of groups was accom-
panied by an individualism—recalling Reynolds—that remained suspi-
cious of all group classifications. As Justice Powell asserted: lilt' it is the
individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications
based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions
impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because
of his membership in a particular group, then constitutional standards
may be applied consistently. "322
 Bakke's reluctance to consider the divi-
sion between racial majorities and minorities as anything but an his-
torical construct likewise parallels an aspect of the neutrality approach
prefigured in Wa/z but more definitively realized in recent government
Encoded in the principle of colorblindness is the concept of neutrality that
mandates absolute government impartiality toward individuals and groups
without regard to their race, color, ethnicity, gender or disabilities. However,
neutrality still remains an amorphous concept in equal protection jurispru-
dence. The Court's unwillingness or inability to clearly articulate, and faith-
fully adhere to, the concept of neutrality has rendered the realization of the
laudable ideal of a colorblind constitution problematic if not impossible.
K.G. Jan Pillai, Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 89, 89-90
(1999).
320 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
321 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
322
 Id. at 299.
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funding cases. 323 According to Justice Powell, "[t]he concepts of `major-
ity' and 'minority' necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and po-
litical judgments.... [T]he white 'majority' itself is composed of vari-
ous minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior
discrimination at the hands of the state and private individuals." 924
Neutrality in the funding area has likewise broken down the sharp divi-
sion between religion and non-religion and treated the distinction as a
difference in degree rather than kind. 325 Under the current state of the •
Court's reasoning, neither whiteness nor nonreligion can be consid-
ered a default. Without these backdrops, protection for particular ra-
cial or religious groups becomes eroded—the new strategy results in-
stead in placing priority on specific individual claims or on fostering a
range of cross-cutting categories that cannot be thought conformable
exclusively with religion or with race.
CONCLUSION
Through the state constitutions and judicial interpretations of
them, "equal protection" arose as a mode of safeguarding religious
liberty, and led towards two disparate notions of discrimination. One
focused more on burdens placed upon religious practitioners and the
other simply disfavored laws targeted against religious individuals or
groups. These diverging visions eventually solidified into the division
between substantive and formal conceptions of equality. At the same
time, courts' decisions under these state constitutions suggested that
the government should not only refrain from harming free exercise
but should also protect religious practices from private interference.
With ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the use of
the Equal Protection Clause in relation to race, a new awareness arose
of the importance of the relationship between the individual and
group in claims for equality. On the federal level, developments in
race-based equal protection jurisprudence thus led to changes in free
323 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10 ("In distinguishing between indoctrination that is at-
tributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the
principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons
without regard to their religion. If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike
eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any
particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government. For attribu-
tion of indoctrination is a relative question. If the government is offering assistance to
recipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the government itself
is not thought responsible for any particular indoctrination.").
924 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295.
345 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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exercise adjudication. Recently, however, while bringing religion
clause doctrine into closer conformity with Equal Protection Clause
precedent, the Court has managed to shift both sets of cases away
from the focus upon groups that constituted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's most important innovation in understanding religious liberty.
Instead the Court has removed protections from suspect classes by
considering collectivities as cultural rather than racial or religious and
viewing claims with less regard to the group to which the individual
belonged. While this approach may have detrimental effects upon
both free exercise and racial equality, it impinges more upon the lat-
ter than the former, because the Court has allowed the government
greater latitude in fixing and preventing violations of religious liberty
than in remedying racial inequality.
